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Abstract
The household registration system (hukou system) in China has hampered rural-urban mi-
gration by posing large migration friction. The system has been gradually relaxed in the past
few decades, but the reforms have been differential in city size. We find a striking contrast in
migration patterns between years 2005 and 2015; rural people tended to move more to large
cities in 2005, but more to small- and medium-sized cities in 2015. We calibrate a spatial quan-
titative model to the world economy in both years with China divided into rural, mega-city, and
other-city regions. We find that alternative urbanization policies that are not differential and
that are more laissez-faire substantially improve national welfare, in magnitudes that are com-
parable to the welfare gains from the trade liberalization that China has put in place in the
past.
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1 Introduction
Rural-urban migration, a.k.a., urbanization, is instrumental to the economy’s industrialization pro-
cess in which the structural transformation from primary to secondary/tertiary industry occurs
mainly around large cities (Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970). In contrast with most coun-
tries where there are no significant institutional migration barriers, China presents an interesting
case when studying the process of rural-urban migration, as migration friction posed mainly by the
household registration system, a.k.a., hukou system, has significantly hampered the movement of
rural labor to cities.
The hukou system is mainly a legacy of the planned-economy regime before the Reform and
Opening-up in 1979, and the Chinese government and the general public are naturally aware of the
various problems that stem from it. The system is complex as it involves the right to work, housing
purchases, health insurance, pension, land allocation in rural areas, and access to education for
the migrants’ children, etc. Reforms to the hukou system have therefore been slow and somewhat
difficult, and thus the system has remained until now. As we detail in Section 2, important policy
documents issued by the central government such as several of the Five-Year Plans of the past two
decades show that the central government tends to believe that the largest cities are too large and
that their growth in size should therefore be restrained. Meanwhile, the government also recognizes
the benefits of rural-urban migration for rural people and the overall economy.
It is then not surprising to find that the reforms of the hukou system have been differential
in city size. Government documents have shown that thoughts about these differential reforms
began to take shape around 2006, and that the reforms gradually took place during 2006–2015.
The difference has intensified over time, as can be seen by comparing the two Five-Year Plans for
2006–2015. Eventually, the restrictions to obtain a hukou in small- and medium-sized cities were
totally abandoned around 2014–2015. However, conditions remain for migrants seeking to obtain
hukous in large cities, and it is still very difficult for the largest cities. In this paper, we seek to
understand the impacts of such differential reforms.
This paper first documents a striking contrast in the migration patterns between 2005 and 2015.
We find that even though there was more rural-urban migration in 2015 than in 2005, the movement
to large and small cities were equal in 2005, whereas the tendency shifted drastically toward small
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cities in 2015. This finding is consistent with the above-mentioned reforms. We then propose
a story with a global perspective in which differential reforms may be harmful to the Chinese
economy compared with cases in which reforms are not differential. We calibrate a quantitative
spatial model to a world economy in which China is divided into three regions: rural, mega urban
region (MUR), which includes all cities with a population of at least 5 million, and other urban
region (OUR), which includes all of the other cities.1 We then conduct a quantitative analysis to
evaluate these differential reforms in comparison with alternative urbanization policies. Note that
our model does not qualitatively build in whether or not these differential reforms are harmful; it
depends on various fundamentals calibrated from data.
For our empirical and quantitative examinations, we choose to view China as the above-
mentioned three regions for the following reasons. First, the MUR is most productive in China,
as it contains the major agglomeration of economic activities: the Yangtze River Delta (which
includes Shanghai, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Nanjing), the Pearl River Delta (which includes Shen-
zhen, Guangzhou, and Dongguan), the Beijing-Tianjin agglomeration, and many other prosperous
cities. Second, we opt not to go for a many-region model within China, as we seek to sharpen
the contrast between large and small cities and to allow room to incorporate other countries in the
world.
Our story is briefly as follows. The differential hukou reforms may be harmful for China’s eco-
nomic development because when resources/population are reallocated away from the most pro-
ductive region, i.e., the MUR, aggregate productivity may be lowered. In various policy narratives,
the government seeks to promote industrialization in the OUR. In other words, the government
prefers to move firms to the OUR over moving people to the MUR. This results in the MUR’s
wages rising faster than in the case without such a preference. Such policy narratives tend to ig-
nore the fact that firms need not move to China’s smaller cities if they believe that labor costs are
too high. They can migrate to other developing countries (henceforth ODC) such as Vietnam for
lower wages or Malaysia for better access to international trade than China’s inland urban areas.
Whether such unintended consequences due to international trade and firm mobility are harmful
for the Chinese economy remains to be determined, because when individuals are encouraged to
move to the OUR, the entry of firms there also increases. Therefore, the relative productivity and
1See Section 2.2 for details on the definition of cities and the partition.
2
wages among the ODC and China’s MUR and OUR are important for determining the overall
effects.
Our general-equilibrium spatial quantitative model extends that in Ma and Tang (2020b), which
builds on Melitz (2003) and Tombe and Zhu (2019), to include the agricultural sector, rural regions,
and a monocentric city structure within the urban regions. The model allows for multiple countries,
each of which consists of multiple regions. Each region is either rural or urban; rural regions en-
gage only in agricultural production, whereas urban regions produce differentiated products which
can be interpreted to include both manufactured goods and services. As in Melitz (2003), the dif-
ferentiated sector is monopolistic competitive; firms are heterogeneous in their productivity and
face selection pressure. Individuals are given their initial locations, and they can choose whether
to migrate to a different location based on their idiosyncratic locational preferences, migration
costs, and consumption utility derived from location-specific amenity, wages, and prices of goods.
A free entry (and exit) condition holds in all locations; in this sense, firms are also mobile across
locations. Importantly, individual workers are mobile only within a country, but firms are mobile
globally.
To properly account for urban costs such as housing and commuting costs, each urban region
is modeled as a (representative) monocentric city, in which city residents choose their locations of
residence and commute to the central business district (CBD) to work. In equilibrium, the longer
the commute, the cheaper the housing price; overall urban costs are positively related to the city
size and outside land value, which in the Chinese context can be taken as the stringency of urban
land supply controlled by the city government (Du and Peiser, 2014; Hsu et al., 2017). In sum, our
model allows four potential forces that could explain the observed migration pattern: migration
costs, relative productivity, relative amenity, and relative conditions of the land/housing market.
Our quantitative model is calibrated to the global economy with China being divided into the
three above-mentioned regions. The ODC and the rest of the world (henceforth ROW) are each
divided into an urban and a rural region. Our calibration exercise involves calibrating a rich set of
region-specific fundamentals by various data sources; a particularly important one is the migration-
flow data, which helps pin down both migration costs and local amenity. The migration-flow
data is from the 2005 and 2015 Intercensal Population Sample Survey of One-Percent (henceforth
One-Percent Population Survey for short) in which surveyed individuals were asked their hukou
3
registration and their whereabouts five years ago. Such information allows us to estimate the
migration probability between each pair of Chinese regions. The initial spatial distributions of
population are then obtained from the Population Census in years 2000 and 2010 for the calibration
exercises in years 2005 and 2015, respectively.
The calibrated migration costs for rural-MUR and rural-OUR migration are similar in 2005;
nonetheless, while both migration costs drop in 2015, the drop for rural-OUR is much sharper
than that for rural-MUR, rationalizing the above-mentioned migration patterns. For the other three
potential forces for explaining the observed pattern — relative productivity, relative amenity, and
housing conditions — the first two are ruled out by the calibration results. If the productivity
in the OUR grows faster than that in the MUR during the 2005–2015 period, i.e., if there is a
regional convergence in productivity, then relative productivity may also contribute to the observed
pattern. However, our calibrated results show that the relative productivity between the two regions
barely changes over this 10-year span. Similarly, if amenity in the OUR relative to that in the
MUR increases in this 10-year span, then this relative amenity may also contribute to the observed
pattern. But we find the opposite: the relative amenity in the OUR decreases. As the calibrated
housing fundamentals do reflect that the MUR’s urban costs rise faster than the OUR’s, we conduct
a counter-factual of letting these fundamentals grow in the pace during these 10-year span. It turns
out this explains only a relatively minor fraction of the observed migration pattern, compared with
the counter-factual analysis based on migration costs.
Based on the baseline calibrated model in 2015, the two main counter-factual exercises that we
conduct are as follows. First, we set the friction of both rural-MUR and rural-OUR migration to be
the same at the level where total rural-urban emigration flows are the same as in the baseline. We
find that the migration pattern is reversed compared with the observed pattern in 2015, with rural-
MUR migration being larger than rural-OUR migration. This is natural because the MUR is more
productive and migration costs are made the same. The resulting reallocation of labor improves
national welfare by 2.6%; this magnitude is substantial considering that this involves only 4.4% of
the total population reallocated from smaller cities to mega cities.
In the second counter-factual exercise, we consider a more liberalized version of the urbaniza-
tion policy in which the rural-MUR migration cost is set the same as the rural-OUR cost, which
remains at the baseline level. In this case, more rural people emigrate compared with the baseline,
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and this emigration is more toward the MUR compared with the first counter-factual. The resulting
improvement in national welfare is larger, at 15.6%.
To put these welfare gains of alternative urbanization policies in perspective, we compare these
gains with welfare gains from trade, as our model allows such a comparison. The question we
ask is how large the percentage reductions in trade costs must be to deliver the same welfare gains
from alternative urbanization policies. Corresponding to our first and second counter-factuals, we
find that 5.8% and 24.6% reductions in trade costs are required. To put this in perspective, China
only lowered its trade barriers by 5.1% from 1996 to 2006 according to the estimates of iceberg
trade costs from ESCAP-World Bank database. This was the period when China entered the World
Trade Organization (at the end of 2001) and when tariffs were substantially reduced. In other
words, by adopting better urbanization policies, China could gain even more than from the trade
liberalization that it has accomplished in the past.
As this paper focuses on the effect of urbanization policy on overall national welfare, it is
closely related to Hsieh and Moretti (2019), who study the effect of housing constraints on dis-
couraging labor from moving into the most productive metropolitan areas in the US. By relaxing
the housing constraints in the most productive metropolitan areas and thus allowing more labor to
migrate into these areas, there are substantial gains in output and welfare because of the improve-
ment in aggregate productivity. Our paper is similar in stressing the effect of labor reallocation
on aggregate productivity and welfare, but we focus on different policies, i.e., urbanization policy
pertinent for developing countries. Moreover, we differ in our incorporation of international trade.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on internal migration in China. Tombe and
Zhu (2019) study the impact of migration on aggregate productivity. Fan (2019) and Zi (2020)
study the effects of international trade on inter-prefecture migration and regional income inequality.
Building upon Tombe and Zhu (2019), Ma and Tang (2020b) further incorporate firm entry and
exit (extensive margin) and more granular internal geography than both of the above-mentioned
papers. They highlight the roles of the relative locations of cities and the fact that the extensive
margin could overturn the welfare results of migration counter-factuals. An et al. (2020) also focus
on the recent wave of policy reforms and empirically document that the relaxation of migration
restrictions in the small cities leads to higher population inflows to and lower wage rates in those
cities. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document the contrast in patterns of
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rural-urban migration between 2005 and 2015. Moreover, our paper is unique as it is the first
quantitative analysis on the effects of the differential hukou reforms, and we show that alternative
urbanization policy can lead to substantial welfare gains, in magnitudes that are comparable to the
trade liberalization that China has accomplished in the past.
Our paper is broadly related to the rapidly growing literature on spatial quantitative economics
(Redding, 2016; Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017) and particularly on migration and trade
(Artuç et al., 2010; di Giovanni et al., 2015; Fajgelbaum et al., 2018; Caliendo et al., 2018, 2019).
Lastly, our work is generally related to the literature on resource misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow,
2009; Song et al., 2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of the hukou
system and various reforms, and presents the empirical migration patterns. Section 3 lays out
the quantitative model, and Section 4 quantifies it. Section 5 conducts a quantitative analysis by
considering alternative urbanization policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Motivating Facts
In this section, we first provide a background introduction of the hukou system and its evolution,
highlighting the differential reforms. We then examine migration patterns in 2005 and 2015 using
the One-Percent Population Survey.
2.1 Background
The hukou system was formally established in 1958 when the government promulgated and imple-
mented the Ordinances on Household Registration (Hu Kou Deng Ji Tiao Li). Under the command-
economy regime when many goods (including foods) and services were rationed, and work man-
agement planned and centralized, population control was important for the feasibility of such a
regime. Therefore, the hukou system was very strict, as any migration from one location to an-
other required various approvals and was generally disallowed.
The restrictions began to loosen after the Reform and Opening-up in 1979. In 1980s, migration
to locations such as special economic zones, e.g., Shenzhen, was much easier than other locations.
While the economy and labor demand in industrialized cities continued to grow, various relaxations
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on the hukou system have been observed during the 1990’s and 2000’s; they mainly vary at the
level of prefectural-level cities. For examples, several prefectures allow for “blue-cover hukou”
(Lan Yin Hu Kou) as a precursor to a regular hukou; to obtain a blue-cover hukou typically requires
conditions concerning a stable job and residence, housing purchase, or investments. In some places
such as Beijing and Shanghai, “work permits” (Gong Zuo Ju Zhu Zheng) are issued to people with
certain qualifications. Oftentimes, work permits are also accompanied by point systems in which
work-permit holders can obtain a regular hukou when enough points are reached. However, these
precursors do not entitle the holders the same rights and benefits as regular hukous, and not every
migrant is able to obtain such precursors.
Not having a hukou or having only a precursor affects one’s employment opportunities, access
to health insurance, unemployment insurance, children’s right to public schools, and pensions even
when one has a formal, full-time job. Universities set different thresholds for the college entrance
exam for different hukous, and they usually favor local hukous; this makes local hukous in hubs of
higher education such as Beijing and Shanghai all the more valuable.
Even though the Chinese government is aware of the need to reform the hukou system in order
to reduce migration friction, their reforms are differential in city size. The evolution of the chapters
regarding urbanization and regional planning in the Five-Year Plans, which are announced in the
first year of every five-year period as comprehensive guidelines for what the central government
plans to do and their priorities in the coming five years, sheds light on the changes in policy and the
underlying thought process. In the 10th Five-Year Plan, which covers 2001–2005, Chapter 9 briefly
discusses urbanization policy and mentions the “coordinated development of large, medium, and
small sized cities”. This chapter also discusses reforming the hukou system and suggests revoking
unreasonable restrictions for rural people to migrate and work in cities and towns. But that is all:
it does not mention any other details on the reform.
In the 11th Five-Year Plan, which covers 2006–2010, Chapter 21 provides more details about
how the rights of rural migrants in cities and towns should be protected, and how hukous should be
gradually granted to those who have stable jobs and residences. Importantly, this chapter explicitly
states that rural migrants should be encouraged to move into small and medium sized cities and
small towns, while the population growth in mega cities should be controlled and contained by
industrial means.
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In the 12th Five-Year Plan, which covers 2011–2015, Chapter 20 puts even more stress than
the previous Five-Year Plan on the reform of the hukou system. It says that the sizes of mega
cities are to be “controlled”, population “management” of large and medium sized cities is to
be improved, and small and medium sized cities and small towns are to relax their conditions
for obtaining hukou. As a result of such a plan, the State Council of China released an official
document in 2014 titled Opinions on Further Reforms on the Household Registration System,
which echoes what was outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan, but asks all towns and small cities (of
which the population is below 500,000) to totally abandon restrictions on obtaining hukous. The
same Opinion also mentions “strictly controlling” the size of mega cities (of which the population
is above 5 million); the opinions on the large and medium-sized cities lie somewhere in between.
Regional planning and, in their terminology, “optimizing the structure of city size distribution”,
have become so important that the government also announced a National New Type Urbanization
Plan in 2014 that covers 2014–2020. The plan is very detailed on almost every aspect of urban
planning, regional planning, and city development; again, the plan explicitly states that “the main
goal of optimizing the structure of city size distribution is to speed up the development of small
and medium sized cities” (Chapter 12).
Based on the concerns over regional inequality, all three Five-Year Plans discuss the Western
Development Program; in the latter two Five-Year Plans, strategies to develop the Middle Region
are also explicitly discussed. All of these mention the potential and strategies of industrialization
in these non-coastal regions, which contain mostly small- and medium-sized cities and only a few
mega cities.
2.2 Migration Patterns
Cities in this paper are defined to be the urban districts of a prefecture (Shi Xia Qu) which ap-
proximate metropolitan areas by international standard (Fujita et al., 2004). The population of
these urban districts within a prefecture is therefore the urban/city population of the prefecture.
To sharpen both our empirical examination and quantitative analysis, we divide China into three
regions: rural, mega urban region (MUR), and other urban region (OUR). Since the 2014 Opinions
on Further Reforms on the Household Registration System by the State Council dictates that the
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sizes of those cities with an urban population of at least 5 million are to be strictly controlled, we
choose this 5-million urban population as the threshold by which to divide urban China. Thus,
those 21 cities above this threshold make up the MUR, whereas all of the other cities are collec-
tively the OUR.2 As prefectures partition China, the rural areas in all of the prefectures are thus
collectively the rural region.
We examine migration patterns in 2005 and 2015 using the information on migration flows
from the One-Percent Population Surveys in 2005 and 2015. This population inter-censal survey
is part of China’s census program. The survey was an attempt to cover one percent of the to-
tal population, and utilized a stratified multi-stage cluster sampling process. Given China’s total
population, these are very large samples. Surveyed individuals were asked their current locations,
hukou registrations, and their whereabouts five years ago. One can use either hukou registrations
or the locations five years ago as the origins for migrants; the resulting migration flows are highly
correlated between the two measures in terms of prefecture-to-prefecture migration. However,
because the 2005 survey reveals the surveyed individuals’ locations five years ago only at the pre-
fecture level but not any finer, we are unable to determine whether their origins were rural or urban.
Thus, we adopt only the definition of origin by hukou registration, which tells whether a hukou is
rural or urban. For more data details, see Appendix C.
Let the migration probability, mij , be defined as the probability of an individual from location
j moving to location i. The survey allows us to compute the observed migration probability m̃ij
by dividing the numbers of individuals from location j who move to i by the total number of
individuals from location j.
Table 1 shows the matrices of migration probability in 2005 and 2015. In 2005, 2.9% of
rural individuals migrated to the MUR, whereas 2.8% of them migrated to the OUR. In 2015,
these numbers rose sharply to 8.4% and 29.4%, respectively. The large increases in the migration
probabilities from rural to both urban regions indicate easier rural-urban migration and suggest that
the relaxation of the hukou restrictions does work to promote urbanization. Nevertheless, whereas
the migration probability to the large cities was similar to that to the smaller cities in 2005, it
2Note that the MUR also corresponds to the top two tiers of cities per the official definition of the State Council
(document reference number 000014349/2014-00135), which classifies prefectures into 7 tiers according to their urban
population. The top tier (Chao Da) includes the prefectures with an urban population of at least 10 million, and the
second tier (Te Da) includes those with an urban population of at least 5 million and below 10 million. Appendix Table
A.2 lists these 21 cities.
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Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.944 0.033 0.070
MUR (d) 0.029 0.959 0.024
OUR (d) 0.028 0.008 0.907
(a) Migration Probability, 2005
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.078 0.180
MUR (d) 0.084 0.894 0.079
OUR (d) 0.294 0.027 0.742
(b) Migration Probability, 2015
Table 1: Matrices of Migration Probability
Note: This table presents the matrices of migration probability. An element at the i-th row and the j-th column
indicates the probability of an individual originating from j and moving to i. Each column sums to 1. The data
source is the One-Percent Population Survey in the respective years, and an “origin” is defined as the place of hukou
registration.
became only a fraction of the probability to the OUR in 2015. Such a striking reversal suggests
that the effects of the differential reforms on the hukou system were substantial, causing the rural
population to increasingly move toward the smaller cities. Also evident from comparing the two
matrices is that the staying probabilities are all lower in 2015 than in 2005, indicating an overall
increased population movement, which is consistent with relaxed migration friction.3
3 Model
Our model adapts the framework in Ma and Tang (2020b), which builds on Melitz (2003) and
Tombe and Zhu (2019). In particular, we add agricultural production, rural-urban migration,
amenity, and urban costs (both housing and commuting) to Ma and Tang (2020b) to study patterns
of rural-urban migration in China and account for the potential driving forces besides changes in
migration barriers.
3There are similar probabilities of urban-to-rural migration to those of rural-to-urban migration in 2015. Note that
this does not imply there is little net rural-urban migration. The One-Percent Population Survey does not offer ag-
gregate population figures, and as the Chinese government denounced the distinction between urban and rural hukous
around 2014, no public statistics reveal these population shares based on hukou after 2014. However, the urbanization
rate (the fraction of actual population living in urban areas) is 54.8% (China Statistical Yearbook), which forms an
upper bound for the urban hukou; hence the lower bound for the rural hukou is 45.2% of the total population. Simple
algebra based on these numbers and Table 1 yields that the lower bound of net rural-urban migration is 5.4% of the
total population in 2015. The larger the shortfall of the population share of urban hukou from the urbanization rate,
the larger the net rural-urban migration flows must be.
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3.1 Basic Environment
The world consists of M countries which we index using c or d. Each country is, in turn, made
of a number of regions which we index as r or s. For ease of exposition, we call a country-region
combination a “location”, and use i or j to index the locations with the understanding that i or j
corresponds to a region r in country c. The total number of locations in the world is denoted as J .
Each country c has population N̄c which can migrate between regions within the country subject
to friction specified later, but international migration is not allowed.
A region is either urban or rural. Urban regions produce differentiated products while rural
regions produce a homogeneous agriculture product. We interpret differentiated products as both
manufactured goods and services. Both differentiated and agricultural goods can be traded both
within and across countries. We assume that intranational trade is frictionless while international
trade is subject to iceberg trade costs.4
Another important difference between urban and rural regions is the urban costs, which primar-
ily consist of housing costs and commuting costs. We incorporate these urban costs by embedding
an (Alonso-Muth-Mills) monocentric city structure within each urban region. Even though our
quantitative exercises lump multiple cities within each urban region, we will use the representa-
tive city size of each urban region to calibrate the model. Recognizing the fact that land costs
(rather than construction costs) are the main driver of the differences in housing costs across dif-
ferent locations within a city, we opt for a monocentric-city model with land consumption only
for tractability. One could, in principle, interpret the housing structure as part of the differentiated
goods.
3.2 Consumption
Individuals in each location i derive utility from consumption and idiosyncratic locational pref-
erence; their utility will be discounted by migration friction if they decide to move to different
locations from their original ones. The non-market components of the utility, i.e., idiosyncratic
4As this paper features the interaction between intranational migration and international trade, we assume fric-
tionless intranational trade for simplicity. Also, intranational trade data are not easy to come by; as we will calibrate
our international-trade aspect of the model using many countries, the lack of intranational trade data in most of these
countries prevents us from incorporating intranational trade costs.
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locational preferences and migration friction, will be specified later. The consumption component
of the utility is given as follows.
The consumption utility function is Cobb-Douglas in the agriculture good, a CES composite of
differentiated goods, and land space. For an individual living (in a representative city) in an urban
region i at a distance z from the central business district (CBD), her utility function is given by
Ui =















where φi is the amenity, yij(k) is the consumption of variety k purchased from location j, ε >
1 represents the elasticity of substitution among varieties, yAi is the consumption of agriculture
produce, `i is the consumption of land space, α < 1 and γ < 1 capture the expenditure shares of
agricultural and differentiated goods, respectively, d(z) > 1 is the “iceberg” commuting cost as in
Ahlfeldt et al. (2015),5 and Ωij denotes the set of varieties from location j available for purchase
in location i and is endogenously determined.
We model the monocentric city as a disk with a radius z̄i on a 2-D plane in which one can
travel from any place in the disk to the CBD via a straight line. (Recall that a “location” in this
paper is used to refer to a region; thus we use “place” to refer to a place within a representative
city.) Production does not take land space; every individual in the city works in the CBD; the city
radius z̄i is endogenously determined. Individuals at different locations z face the same prices of
agricultural and differentiated goods but different commuting costs d(z) and land rents Ri(z). In
equilibrium and conditional on the idiosyncratic locational preferences, consumption utilities in
different places z are equalized, which implies that the land rent Ri(z) decreases in z. In textbook
monocentric-city models, an outside land rent R̄i is assumed to determine the city edge z̄i, and is
often interpreted as the agricultural land rent. However, we recognize that there are institutional
barriers on transfers between rural and urban land in China such as local governments’ control
over land supply and various stipulations on the collective ownership of rural land. Thus, R̄i’s are
assumed to be exogenous and will be calibrated to reflect each urban region’s land supply strin-
gency; hence they will not be linked to the agricultural/rural land rent which will be endogenously
5Instead of the traditional approach of modeling commuting costs as monetary costs, we follow Ahlfeldt et al.
(2015) by modeling the commuting costs as an iceberg cost for ease of calibration for quantitative purposes.
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determined. Nevertheless, the equilibrium condition Ri(z̄i) = R̄i still holds.
For the rural region, as rural residents are agriculture workers, they are assumed to live on the
farms and hence there is no commuting cost, i.e., d(z) = 1. The land rents facing all rural residents
are the same and denoted simply as Ri.
The set of varieties consumed in location i, Ωi ≡ ∪jΩij , depends directly on firm entry and
exit decisions in i, and also on the number of firms that choose to sell to i from all of the other
locations. The entry, exit, and “exporting” decisions made by the firms are all dependent on the
endogenous population distribution and migration patterns, which in turn rely on the fundamental
forces in the model: sectoral productivity differences across locations, migration friction that could
be affected by urbanization policies, and the trade friction that we will specify later. In general, a
larger market size/access, potentially as a result of migration, supports more firms and varieties in
a location, which is welfare-improving given the love of variety embedded in the utility function
specification.
3.3 Differentiated Sector
We model the differentiated sector following Melitz (2003): firms with heterogeneous productivity
compete in a monopolistic-competitive market, and each firm produces a unique variety. The one-
to-one mapping between variety and firm allows us to interchangeably use k to index both the
variety and the firm producing it.
In the differentiated sector, “exporting” from location j to i incurs a fixed cost denoted as fij
in the unit of input bundles specified later. Trade is also subject to the standard iceberg trade cost
denoted as τij ≥ 1: to deliver one unit of a good from location j to location i, the firm must
produce and ship τij units from location j. Firms must also pay fixed costs denoted as fii units of
input bundles in order to sell to the local market.







where 1/a(k) is the productivity of firm k, and input bundles are made of a Cobb-Douglas combi-
nation of local labor and a CES composite of intermediate inputs from all differentiated products














where ni(k) is the labor employment of firm k, yij(k′; k) is the amount of variety k′ purchased
from location j for the production of k, and β is the relative weight of labor in the production
function.
Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, as a(k), the input bundle requirement for producing
one unit of output, varies across firms. For quantitative purposes, we follow the literature and












where θ is the tail index and µj is the parameter that reflects the average productivity in location j.
A higher µj implies that the average draw of a is lower in j, and 1/µj defines the maximum of a.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a is therefore
Gj(a) = (µja)
θ, a ∈ (0, 1/µj].
Entry and Exit There is a large pool of potential entrants. To enter production in location j, an
entrant must pay fe units of input bundles acquired in location j. Upon paying the entry cost, the
firm draws its productivity from Gj(a), based on which it decides whether to produce or to exit.
The outside option of exiting is normalized to zero.
6See Chaney (2008) who assumes the Pareto in a Melitz model. The Pareto distribution is often assumed because
of its analytical convenience and its ability to generate power laws in firm size, which is a well-documented empirical
regularity. See, for example, Luttmer (2007).
14
3.4 Agriculture Sector







The input bundle to agriculture production is a Cobb-Douglas combination of labor (Nj), land
(Lj), and intermediate goods:
bAj = ν












The trade in agriculture goods is also subject to an iceberg cost denoted as τAij ≥ 1. The price of
agriculture goods from rural location j in location i is then a function of productivity, trade costs,







As the agriculture product is homogeneous, the realized price of the good in location i is the







Note that the existence of fixed production factors for agricultural production7 imply that each
country’s rural region must produce even if it imports from other countries. Equilibrium rural
wages would adjust so that the domestic agricultural price is equal to the import price.
7First, the fixed land endowment must be utilized due to the Cobb-Douglas production function. Moreover, id-
iosyncratic locational preferences imply that there must always exist a positive labor supply in the rural region.
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3.5 Rural Land Market and Land Rent Rebate
The urban land market clears in a standard way as we will illustrate in Section 3.8.2. Assume the
two rural land uses (agricultural production and residential) are perfect substitutes, and hence one
land rent clears the land market in each rural region. Unlike most monocentric city models which
assume absentee landlords, we assume that every individual in every country c owns an equal share
of the land in the country; hence the aggregate land rent in this country is rebated to each citizen
evenly. The rebated amount to an individual is denoted as Tc.8
3.6 Migration Decision
As mentioned, there are three components in the utility of individuals: the consumption utility, and
two non-market components: idiosyncratic locational preferences and bilateral migration friction.
For the consumption utility, the associated indirect utility for an individual at an urban region i in
country c and at a distance z from the CBD is given by
vi(z) =
φi (wi + Tc)





where wi is the urban wage rate and Pi is the ideal price index of the differentiated goods. The












Furthermore, vi(z) = v̄i in equilibrium for all z within the same city. We will derive the explicit
expression of v̄i in Section 3.8.2. The indirect utility for an individual at a rural region i is written
in the same way as that in (8) except that d(z) = 1 and Ri(z) does not vary in z.
We now describe the two non-market components of the utility. First, each individual draws an
idiosyncratic preference shock toward each location {ιi}Ji=1, where ιi is i.i.d across locations and
8Having rebates of land rents instead of assuming absentee landlords is mainly because it is better to account for
all income in a general equilibrium model. For example, an increase in a particular country’s urban or agricultural
productivity will increase the aggregate land rents of this country, and missing these land rents will understate the
income effects on various general-equilibrium objects such as relative trade flows, relative firm entry, and hence price
indices among countries.
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individuals. We assume that ιi follows a Fréchet distribution with CDF





where κ is the shape parameter that controls the heterogeneity of these locational-preference
shocks; the smaller the κ, the larger the heterogeneity. Such locational-preference specification
has been well understood as a dispersion force, which is stronger if the heterogeneity is larger (κ
is smaller). See Murata (2003) for an early example.
Second, moving from j to i incurs origin-destination specific costs similar to the iceberg cost
of trade, which we denote as λij ≥ 1. The costs of migration enclose not only the informa-
tion/monetary/financial costs of moving but also the various policy barriers that deter migration as
discussed in Section 2. If one chooses to stay in her original location, there is no additional cost;
hence λjj = 1 for all location j.
Let Jc denote the set of locations within country c. Combining the three components specified
above, an individual living in location j will migrate to i if and only if living in i provides him with






, ∀ i′ ∈ Jc.
3.7 Equilibrium
Let pij(.) and qij(.) denote the profiles of price and total quantity of differentiated goods sold
from j to i across Ωij , respectively. Let Nj and Ij denote the numbers of workers and entrants
in location j, respectively. Let Xi denote the aggregate expenditure on the differentiated goods in
location i. Balanced trade implies thatXi is also the total revenue of differentiated goods produced
in location i, which is equal to the total costs under the free-entry condition (zero expected profit).
As all costs, fixed or variable, are in terms of input bundles specified in (3), the total expenditure on
the intermediate goods in location i is (1−β)Xi. We concisely describe the equilibrium conditions
here and refer the reader to Appendix B for more details.
Definition: An equilibrium consists of a tuple of prices {wj, pij(.), PAj , Rj(.)}i,j , a tuple of quan-
tities {Nj, Ij, qij(.), yji(.), yji(, ; .), yAj , `j(.), z̄j} for each location i and each urban location j, and
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a tuple of quantities {Nj, qAj , Lj, yji(.), yAj , `j} for each location i and each rural location j such
that the following conditions hold:
(a) Individuals maximize their utility by choosing locations (including the places of residence
within a city if the location is an urban region), residential land consumption, and the con-
sumption bundles from both sectors.
(b) Each firm maximizes its profits by choosing which markets to sell to and the prices charged to
each market.
(c) The free-entry condition holds in each location.
(d) The agriculture market clears in each location.
(e) Within each urban region j, land rentRj(.) clears the urban land market so that urban residents
are indifferent across places of residence, vj(.) = v̄j and that the city edge z̄j is such that
Rj (z̄j) = R̄j .
(f) In any rural region j, the land rent Rj clears the land market so that the aggregate land demand
Lj +Nj`j equals the total land endowment there.
(g) The differentiated goods market clears such that the aggregate expenditure on the differentiated
goods in location i equals the final consumption γ(wi + Tc)Ni and intermediate goods use
(1− β)Xi: Xi = γ(wi + Tc)Ni + (1− β)Xi.
(h) Labor market clearing for each country c:
∑
j∈Jc Nj = N̄c.
3.8 Analytical Solutions
We sketch the analytical solution in this subsection, and refer the reader to Appendix B for details.
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3.8.1 Firm’s Problem
Demand Maximizing the utility function specified in equation (1) yields the demand function






The firm takes the aggregate variablesXi and Pi as given when deciding its price, pij(k). As usual,
higher total expenditure and lower firm-level price lead to higher demand. Also, the substitution
effect implies that a higher price index in the market (Pi) also increases the demand for firm k as
ε > 1.
We solve the firm’s problem by backward induction: we start with the pricing decisions condi-
tional on the firm selling to market i; we then outline the decision to sell to market i conditional on
firm entry; lastly, we turn to the entry and exit decisions.




pij (k) qij (k)− a (k) qij (k) τijχj,
where qij(k) is given by (10), and χj is the cost of an input bundle in the differentiated sector at









A more productive firm with a lower a(k) is able to charge a lower price, and thus enjoys a larger
revenue in region i as the demand elasticity ε is greater than 1. The variable profit is also higher
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At market i, if the market size Xi is larger, or the other firms in the market are relatively unproduc-
tive and charge higher prices so that Pi is higher, the variable profit for firm k is higher.
“Exporting” and Total Profit Conditional on the solution of the pricing problem, a firm with
input bundle requirement a(k) in location j serves location i if and only if the variable profit covers
the fixed cost of trade, fij: πij(a) ≥ fijχj . Moreover, the inequality implies a cutoff rule: the firm












A firm in j compares its input bundle requirement to all the cutoffs aij, i = 1, 2, · · · , J to determine
the market(s) to sell to.
The sales decisions at this stage imply that the total profit of the firm with unit cost a(k), net of




1 (a (k) < aij) (πij(a)− χjfij) ,
where 1 (a (k) < aij) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the draw is low enough to serve i,
and 0 otherwise. More productive firms sell to more markets and earn a higher total profit.
Entry Decision At this final stage, we characterize the entry decision of the potential firms. Prior
to paying the entry cost fe and draw a(k), the expected profit of a potential entrant in location j is





The expectation is taken over the distribution of a(k) as characterized by Gj(a). In equilibrium,
the expected profit in location j must be equal to the entry costs:
Πj = feχj. (11)
Finally, the ideal price index of the differentiated sector in i is the aggregation over all the

















where Ij is the number of firms that enter the differentiated sector in location j and aij is the cutoff
below which the firm in location j sells to location i. The “love of variety” effect is reflected in
the above expression: if more firms are able to sell to market i through either a higher number of
entrants (Ij) or a higher cutoff (aij), then the ideal price index in location i is lower.
3.8.2 Equilibrium within a City and Aggregate Land Rent
For an urban region i, let N̂i be the average city size within the urban region so thatNi is the product
of N̂i and the number of cities within the region, which is exogenously given. As Ni is determined
in cross-region spatial equilibrium, we take N̂i as given when considering the equilibrium within
the city.
The income of an individual in an urban region i in country c is given by wi + Tc, and the
Cobb-Douglas structure entails the indirect utility (8). Following Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), we let
d (z) = eδτ(z), where τ (z) is travel time from z to the CBD. Furthermore, assume that τ (z) = tz,










The population density at each point z is the inverse of land use per person, i.e., 1/`i(z). The land
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Using (12), (13), and the facts that `i(z) = (1− α− γ) (wi + Tc) /Ri(z) and that Ri (z̄i) = R̄i, it










δ2t2 (wi + Tc) N̂i
2π (1− α− γ) R̄i
. (14)
Taking (wi + Tc) and N̂i as given, this is the single equation that pins down the city radius z̄i and
summarizes the information on commuting costs and land rents. Observing the indirect utility
(8) and noting that vi(.) = v̄i, we see that d(z)Ri(z)1−α−γ = C for some constant C. Using




The equilibrium utility is therefore given by
v̄i =







Next, we consider how land rent rebate Tc is determined; for this we must derive the aggregate
land rent. The Cobb-Douglas structure implies that the aggregate land rents in an urban region i and
the aggregate residential land rents in a rural region i are both given by (1− α− γ) (wi + Tc)Ni.
Recall that Jc denotes the set of locations in country c, and further define RA,c and LA,c as agricul-
tural land rent and land use in country c, respectively.10 We have
Tc =
RA,cLA,c + (1− α− γ)
∑
i∈Jc (wi + Tc)Ni
N̄c
,
9As in a standard monocentric city model, the land-market-clearing condition is conveniently expressed as the
integral of population density over the city space (the disk with a radius z̄i) which should equal to the total city
population. This is because the population density is the inverse of land demand per person (1/`i(z)), whereas the
area of the disk gives the land supply.




RA,cLA,c + (1− α− γ)
∑
i∈Jc wiNi
(α + γ) N̄c
.
The right-hand side of the above equation implicitly depends on {Tc} across countries via the
general equilibrium objects in the numerator. We solve for {Tc} using the above equation as a
fixed-point mapping.
3.8.3 Migration Decision
It is straightforward to show that conditional on {v̄i}i∈Jc , the fraction of the population that mi-








The above equation is similar to that used in Redding (2016) and Tombe and Zhu (2019) and is
related to the “gravity equation” in international migration flows such as those in Grogger and
Hanson (2011) and Ortega and Peri (2013). Moreover, note that κ is the migration elasticity with
respect to friction. The larger the κ, the less heterogeneous the idiosyncratic locational preferences,
and hence the more sensitive migration flows are to changes in migration friction.
4 Quantification
To quantify the model, we group the world into three countries: China (CHN), other developing
countries (ODC), and the rest of the world (ROW). As the calibration strategy requires data from
the World Development Indicators (WDI), the Penn World Table (PWT), and the Inter-Country
Input-Output (ICIO) tables, we take the largest intersection of countries from these three datasets
as our sample of countries. Out of the 63 countries in the sample, we group the countries whose
average per capital GDP is less then 2/3 of the USA’s into the “other developing countries”, and
the rest as the ROW. Appendix C provides the details about the sample definition, and Appendix
Table A.1 lists all the countries in the sample. As mentioned in Section 2.2, China is divided into
three regions: rural (r = 1), the MUR (r = 2), and the OUR (r = 3). The other two countries only
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contain one rural and one urban region each.11
We calibrate the model to the world economy around year 2005 and around year 2015 sepa-
rately. The model parameters fall into one of the two categories. The first group of parameters
is common across the two years, and the second group is calibrated to each year. Within the
year-specific parameters, some parameters are calibrated directly from the data without solving
the model, while the others are jointly calibrated based on model simulations. In this section, we
introduce the calibration strategy for each of the parameters, and refer the reader to Appendix C
for more details. All parameters are summarized in Table 2 and 3.
4.1 Common Parameters
This group of parameters is common across the two years. Table 2 summarizes these parameters:
• The labor share in differentiated products, β = 0.37. The data source is the Input-Output
Table in China in 2002. This parameter is the ratio between the total value-added and the
total output across all non-agriculture industries. This calibration strategy compensates for
the absence of capital in the production function by treating the return to capital as part of
the return to labor.
• The elasticity of substitution, ε, and the Pareto tail index, θ. As the tail index also serves as
the trade elasticity in the model, we set θ = 4 following the estimates in Simonovska and
Waugh (2014). Moreover, θ
ε−1 equals the tail index of the employment distribution of firms
in equilibrium. In light of this, we set ε = 4.717 so that the tail index equals 1.076, the value
reported in Ma and Tang (2020b) based on the Chinese plant-level data.12
• The shape parameter of the distribution of locational preference, κ = 1.63. This parameter
is also the elasticity of migration flows with respect to friction. Monte et al. (2018), using
the same Fréchet distribution, estimate this parameter to be 3.3 in the context of the US and
Hsieh and Moretti (2019) set it to 2.0 based on a similar extreme-value distribution. Bryan
11Note that as we lump countries besides China into two blocks, it is difficult to interpret the rural-urban migration
within each block. As our focus is on China’s patterns of rural-urban migration, the rural and urban population in these
two country blocks are held fixed in our quantitative exercises.
12Note that this value is rather close to 1.06, the value reported by Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007) using plant-
level data from the US.
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Name Value Source Note
β 0.37 Input-Output Table, 2002 Labor share in differentiated goods production
ε 4.717 Firm size distribution in China Elasticity of substitution
θ 4.0 Simonovska and Waugh (2014) Trade elasticity and Pareto tail index in productivity distribution
κ 1.63 Ma and Tang (2020a) Migration elasticity and shape parameter in location preference
δ 0.01 Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) Semi-elasticity of iceberg commuting cost to travel time (minutes)
t 4.35 Baidu Hundred-City Commuting Data Travel time in minutes per unit distance
α 0.15 Input-Output Table, 2005 Expenditure share of agricultural goods in 2005
0.07 Input-Output Table, 2015 Expenditure share of agricultural goods in 2015
γ 0.7875 1− α− 0.0625 (see Section 4.2.1) Expenditure share of the differentiated products in 2005
0.8675 1− α− 0.0625 (see Section 4.2.1) Expenditure share of the differentiated products in 2015
Table 2: Parameters
Note: This table summarizes the calibrated model parameters common across years and the year-specific α and γ.
and Morten (2019) estimate it to be 2.7 using Indonesia data. The results from the reduced
form gravity-equation estimations often suggest that the distance elasticity of migration is
generally smaller than 2.0. In the case of the European countries, it is found to be around
between 1.4 and 2.2 in (Stillwell et al., 2014). In this paper, we use κ = 1.63 based on Ma
and Tang (2020a), which is estimated from the One-Percent Population Survey in 2005. We
will later use κ = 3.3, an estimate from the higher end of the spectrum, as a robustness check
in Section 5.5. As will be seen in Section 5.5, all the main welfare results are strengthened
in a world with a higher migration elasticity as the population movements are more sensitive
to changes in urbanization policy. In this sense, the baseline results reported in this paper are
conservative estimates of the impact of urbanization policies.
• The commuting costs. Following Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), the semi-elasticity of iceberg com-
muting cost to travel time (minutes), δ, is set to 0.01. As the commuting time is assumed to
be a linear function of distance, tz, the parameter t, i.e., the travel time per unit distance, is
set to 4.35, which is the average travel time in minutes per kilometer across all cities in the
Baidu Hundred-City Commuting Cost Report.
4.2 Year-Specific Parameters
All of the other parameters in the model are calibrated to match the data moments in year t = 2005
and 2015 separately. We first introduce the parameters that are calibrated without solving the
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model, and then move to the simulation-based joint calibration.
4.2.1 Expenditure Shares, Initial Population, Trade Cost, Urban Productivity, Land Rent,
and Agricultural Production
Expenditure Shares The expenditure share of agriculture products, α, comes from the Input-
Output Table from China in the year 2005 and 2015 respectively. We back out this parameter
using the household expenditure on agriculture products as a share of total consumption. In 2005,
α = 0.15, and in 2015, α = 0.07. We set the expenditure share of land consumption to 0.0625,
which is the product of housing expenditure share (0.25 from Davis and Ortalo-Magné, 2011)
and the share of land in the housing construction costs (0.25 from Combes et al., 2019). The
expenditure share of the differentiated products, γ, is then inferred by γ = 1−α−0.0625 = 0.7875
in 2005 and γ = 0.8675 in 2015.
Initial Population To construct the initial population distributions for the 2005 and 2015 models,
our starting point is the country-level population data in the year 2000 and 2010 from the Penn
World Table, respectively. Multiplying the total population by the percentage of the workforce
employed in agriculture from the WDI yields the rural population in each country. The total urban
population is simply the difference between the total and rural populations. Within China, the
total urban population must be further divided between the MUR and OUR. To do this, we use the
distribution of prefecture-level urban population, i.e., the population in the collection of “districts”
within a prefecture (Shi Xia Qu), from the 2000 and 2010 Population Censuses to allocate the total
urban population to the two regions. In the last step, we normalize the initial population headcount
in both periods so that the rural population in China in the year 2000 is 1.0.
Trade Costs We follow di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) by using the Doing Business Database
from the World Bank to estimate the fixed costs of trade. We take the number of days required
to start a new business in each country in year t = {2005, 2015} and compute the population-
weighted average within each country group to estimate fii, the fixed costs of country i to sell
to its own market. We then construct the fixed costs of exporting from j to i as fij = fii + fjj .
Lastly, we normalize all the fixed costs so that fii for China equals 1. Conditional on the estimated
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fixed costs of exports, we then follow Novy (2013) to back out the variable trade costs, τij , from
the observed trade flow. The trade flow data, which includes domestic absorption, come from the
ICIO Tables provided by the OECD. We assume free trade between regions within each country.
In our context, free trade means that τij = 1.0 between all i and j within the same country so trade
does not suffer from iceberg friction, and fij = fjj so that firms originating from region j face the
same fixed costs in selling locally and to another region i in the same country.13
We estimate the variable trade costs for agricultural goods as proportional to τij , so that τAij =
τ̄ × τij . The ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database provides estimates of the variable trade
costs by country and industry, which includes agriculture, following the methods in Novy (2013).
We take the average ratio of agriculture trade costs to manufacturing trade costs in that database as
the estimate of τ̄ and arrive at τ̄ = 2.14.
Productivity in Urban Regions The productivities in the urban regions, {µj}, are estimated
based on the cross-sectional TFP (cTFP) data provided by the PWT. In year t = {2005, 2015},
we take the population-weighted average within each country group to obtain the estimates for all
three countries. As the ODC and ROW only have a single urban region, the above step provides
the productivities in these countries up to a scale; however, more work needs to be done to infer
the urban productivity in the two urban regions in China.
To back out the productivities in the two urban regions in China, we start by estimating the
productivity for each of the 279 cities (which correspond to 279 prefectural-level cities) in China.
We follow the estimation strategy outlined in Ma and Tang (2020b), who apply the methods in
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) to the context of China. We outline the estimation in Appendix
C and refer readers to Ma and Tang (2020b) for more details. With the estimated productivity for
each individual city, it is straightforward to aggregate by taking the population-weighted average
within each urban region to arrive at an estimate of the ratio of productivity between the two urban
regions.
To back out the level of the urban productivity, we further require that the population-weighted
average of the two urban productivities be equal to the cTFP in China from the PWT. This addi-
tional constraint implies that the country-level TFP in China coming from the previous exercise is
13As is common in the Melitz model with entry costs (fe), we scale the {fij} matrices by an arbitrary number to
ensure an interior solution of the cut-offs in all the baseline and counter-factual simulations.
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Rural China MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Ni, 2005 1.00 0.30 0.76 1.62 2.41 0.04 1.27
Ni, 2015 0.71 0.42 1.05 1.48 3.05 0.03 1.37
µi, 2005 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.02 1.14 1.32 2.33
µi, 2015 1.31 1.29 1.11 1.22 1.52 1.59 2.63
φi, 2005 1.04 0.90 1.05 - - - -
φi, 2015 1.06 1.00 0.99 - - - -
R̄i, 2005 - 124.24 51.65 - - - -
R̄i, 2015 - 657.16 125.15 - - - -
νi, 2005 0.33 - - 0.45 - 0.27 -
νi, 2015 0.33 - - 0.45 - 0.26 -
ηi, 2005 0.26 - - 0.22 - 0.20 -
ηi, 2015 0.26 - - 0.20 - 0.24 -
Land, 2005 1.00 - - 3.16 - 1.62 -
Land, 2015 1.09 - - 3.30 - 1.52 -
(a) Initial Population, Productivity, Amenity, Outside Land Value, Agriculture Production Function, and Land
Endowments
China (o) ODC (o) ROW (o)
China (d) 1.00 2.59 2.55
ODC (d) 2.59 1.00 2.07
ROW (d) 2.55 2.07 1.00
(b) τij , 2005
China (o) ODC (o) ROW (o)
China (d) 1.00 2.46 2.48
ODC (d) 2.46 1.00 2.05
ROW (d) 2.48 2.05 1.00
(c) τij , 2015
China (o) ODC (o) ROW (o)
China (d) 1.00 2.50 1.80
ODC (d) 2.50 1.50 2.30
ROW (d) 1.80 2.30 0.80
(d) fij , 2005
China (o) ODC (o) ROW (o)
China (d) 1.00 1.96 1.32
ODC (d) 1.96 0.96 1.28
ROW (d) 1.32 1.28 0.32
(e) fij , 2015
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 1.00 3.14 2.03
MUR (d) 21.58 1.00 10.02
OUR (d) 20.74 17.24 1.00
fe 6.98
(f) Joint Calibration of λij and fe, 2005
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 1.00 1.02 0.67
MUR (d) 15.05 1.00 4.86
OUR (d) 5.68 6.93 1.00
fe 10.67
(g) Joint Calibration λij and fe, 2015
Table 3: Year-Specific Parameters
Note: This table summarizes the calibrated model parameters that are year-specific, excluding α and γ that are reported
in Table 2.
28
comparable to the TFP measures for the ODC and ROW. This constraint, together with the relative
productivity in the previous step, constitutes a simple two-equation system from which the two
urban productivities in China can be computed.
Lastly, we normalize the productivity vectors so that µj = 1 in the MUR of China in 2005.
To reflect the total productivity growth between the two years, we multiply the entire productivity
vector in 2015 by 1.2946, the ratio between the inter-temporal measure of TFP (rTFPna) in China
between 2015 and 2005 from the PWT.
As reported in Table 3a, we find that the relative productivity between the two urban regions
in China barely moves between the two years. The productivity of the OUR is 86% of the MUR
back in 2005, and the relative productivity barely moves ten years later. As there is no “regional
convergence” in productivity, the productivity gap between the two urban regions does not explain
the reversal of migration patterns observed in Table 1.
Agricultural Land, Production Function, and Productivity The variables related to the rural
regions come from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Services (USDA-ERS)
database. All of these parameters are reported in Table 3a.
We use the total agricultural land, which includes un-irrigated and irrigated cropland and pas-
tures, as the measure of the land endowment of each country’s rural region. We sum the agricultural
land to the country-group level and normalize the land endowment in China in the year 2005 to 1.
The database provides a break-down of factor input costs into six categories: labor, land, live-
stock, machinery, fertilizer, and feed. The first two categories directly correspond to labor and
land in our model, respectively. We treat the remaining four factors as intermediate inputs in our
model. In a given year, we aggregate the land and labor shares to the country-group level by taking
weighted averages. The weights are the rural population and the rural land endowments of each
country.
The agricultural productivity is then computed as the exponentiated residual by regressing
the logarithm of agricultural output on the logarithm of all six inputs at the country level. The
country-group-level agricultural productivity is obtained as the weighted average of country-level
agricultural productivity with the weights being the agricultural output. Within each year, we
normalize the agricultural productivity so that the rural productivity in China is 1. Lastly, similar
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to the urban productivity, to reflect the total productivity growth between the two years, we multiply
the rural productivity vector in 2015 by 1.20, the average growth rate of rural productivity across
countries between 2015 and 2005 in USDA-ERS.14
Outside Land Rent, R̄i Equations (14) and (15) offer equilibrium conditions to back out R̄i in
the urban regions in China. We first evaluate Equation (15) at z = 0 and use the CBD land rent
as proxies to the left-hand side (LHS) of the equation to pin down the relationship between R̄i and
z̄i.15 In the second step, we then use Equation (14) to back out the outside land rent, R̄i. We proxy
the term (wi + Tc)N̂i in each region using the GDP of an average city in the respective region.
Table 3 reports the estimates of R̄i for the two urban regions in China. The rural Ri in China
is not reported, as it is endogenously determined from the rural land market. We nevertheless
compute a rural Ri from the data as it serves as a reference point to convert the R̄i in the urban
regions in China to the same units as the endogenous land rents in the model.16 To compute the Ri
for the rural regions, we use the inferred rural land rent. We use the factor share data from USDA-
ERS and the rural output and land endowment data from the City Statistical Yearbooks to estimate
the annual rural land rent as the ratio between the expenditure on land and the land endowment.17
The R̄i’s for other countries’ urban regions are given by equilibrium rural land rent; thus, it
is not an object of calibration. We adopt this approach for two reasons. First, the institutional
barriers to rural-urban land transfers in other countries are generally lower than China’s; second,
there is no clear-cut way of defining the outside land rent in the context of country groups instead
of individual countries.
The estimated R̄i’s are reported in Table 3a. The outside land rent is always higher in the MUR
than in the OUR, as expected. However, the gap widens drastically from 140% in 2005 to more
14In the quantification, we normalize both the productivity in the MUR and China’s rural region to 1 in 2005.
There is no need to specify the relative productivity between the rural region and the MUR in China, as it does not
affect the equilibrium outcome, including the migration and trade patterns. This is because the Cobb-Douglas utility
function implies the irrelevance of the relative productivity between the two sectors. Intuitively, scaling all of the rural
productivities by a constant affects only the price and not the agriculture product’s expenditure share.
15See Appendix C for how CBD land rents are calculated.
16The R̄i for the urban regions in China as computed in the previous steps are denoted in Chinese RMB and are thus
not consistent with the endogenously determined land rent in the model which uses rural wage rate as the numeraire.
We use the Ri computed here for rural China and the endogenously determined land rent in rural China to compute
the exchange rate between the numeraire in the model and RMB and convert the urban R̄i from the data to the model
units.
17The land endowment data from USDA-ERS cannot be used to infer land rent as the unit of land is in “efficiency
units”, not physical units (hectares) as in the CBD land rent data.
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than 500% in 2015.
4.2.2 Joint Calibration
The above quantification procedure leaves 10 parameters to be jointly calibrated in each year.
These parameters are the entry cost, fe, the amenity for the three regions in China, and the six
off-diagonal terms in the migration cost matrix in China, λij . We pin down these parameters using
an iterative procedure as follows.
Step 1: With an initial guess of {λij}, we use Equations (16–17) and the data on the bilateral
migration flow and city-level characteristics to estimate {φi}.
Step 2: Conditional on {φi}, we solve the model to jointly calibrate the remaining 7 parameters
(fe and {λij}) using 7 moments in the data.
Step 3: Go back to Step 1 until {λij} converge.
In practice, we start with the initial guess of λij = 1, ∀i, j and use 1.0E-4 as the threshold for
convergence. The procedure converges in less than 5 iterations. In the rest of this section, we
describe the details of each step. These parameters are reported in Tables 3a, 3f, and 3g.
Step 1: Estimating Amenity Conditional on λij Conditional on a guess of λij , we use the
observed between-city migration flow and the city-level characteristics to backout the amenity of
the urban regions in three steps. The overall strategy is similar to the estimation of productivity
as explained above: we first estimate the amenity at the city level, and then aggregate up to the
region level. Note that as we only study the migration problem in China, we abstract away from
the amenities in the other two countries.
In the first step, we interpret Equation (17) at the city level and express bilateral migration
flows as







− κ log(λij). (18)
In equation 18, the LHS is the observed migration flow from j to i. We regress the LHS against
the destination and origin fixed effects, as well as the log(λij) from the previous iteration. In this
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regression, the destination fixed effect of city i, which we denote as Di, absorbs the indirect utility
of city i as Di = κ log(v̄i).18





Combining this with Equation (16) entails








We then combine this expression with the earlier expression of the destination fixed effects:
1
κ






We regress the 1
κ
Di from the first step on log(Ri(0)), approximated by the CBD land rent, and per
capita GDP to capture the second term. Therefore, the residual from this regressing equation 19
contains the logarithm of amenity, as well as that of prices.
In the last step, we linearly project the residual, denoted as ei, on a vector of city-level charac-
teristics, Xi, that is related to amenity:19
ei = b0 + b1Xi,
and use the prediction from the projection as the estimate for log(φi) = b̂1Xi at the city level.
This last step relates the estimated amenity to a wide range of observed characteristics. Moreover,
by capturing these elements in φi, the projection ensures that the estimated λij from the next stage
will not be contaminated by the same elements.
With the city-level amenity, we aggregate the amenity at the city level to the region level, using
the city population as weights. Note that in the entire procedure, we treat the urban and rural areas
of a prefecture as separate locations; in total we thus have 279 ∗ 2 “cities” in each regression.
18We note that this step also yields an estimate of κ. We prefer to use the κ from the literature as explained in
the earlier parts of this section since the estimation procedure outlined here is not designed to estimate the migration
elasticity. We control for λij to ensure the consistency of the estimated Di, not to estimate κ. The same considerations
apply to the estimated 1− α− γ as well: we prefer to use the α and γ reported in Table 2.
19City-level characteristics include the average temperature, precipitation, elevation, and slope; the number of uni-
versities, middle schools, and primary schools; the number of university, middle school, and primary school teachers;
the number of public library books; the number of hospitals, hospital beds, and doctors; the percentage of green fields
in constructed areas; and the ease of access to transportation networks. More details are provided in Appendix C.
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Step 2: Calibrating fe and λij Conditional on φi Conditional on φi from the previous step, we
then solve the model and calibrate the remaining 7 parameters by targeting 7 equilibrium moment
conditions in the model.
The entry cost fe determines the numbers of entrants in urban regions. We use this parameter to
match the firms-to-population ratio in the MUR in China. The number of firms data come from the
2004 and 2014 Economic Census in China for the quantification in 2005 and 2015, respectively,
and our target moment is 15.1 and 19.3 entering firms per thousand population.
The last six λij parameters are pinned down by the migration probability matrix estimated from
the One-Percent Population Survey as presented in Table 1. The migration friction {λij} is backed
out by matching the model migration probability {mij} given in Equation (17) to the observed
migration probability {m̃ij} in Table 1.
4.3 Discussion on Parameter Estimates and Possible Explanations
In this subsection we make several observations based on parameter estimates. First, the migration
costs, {λij}, decline substantially between 2005 and 2015: the average magnitude drops by 65%
within this 10-year span. The relaxation of migration friction is strongest among the rural-to-urban
flows: the costs of moving from the rural region to the MUR drop by 56%, and to the OUR, 62%.
The changes in the other bilateral migration costs are lower and yet still sizable. The sharp decline
in the calibrated λij parameters is underpinned by the significant shifts in the migration probability
matrix in the data as presented in Table 1. For example, in 2005 around 94% of the individuals
originating from rural areas choose to stay in rural areas, whereas 10 years later, the same statistic
plunges to only 62%.
Comparing the migration friction across the two periods also reveals a fundamental change
in the urbanization policy that favors smaller cities. In 2005, the costs of moving from the rural
region to the two urban regions in China are roughly the same at λ21 = 21.58 and λ31 = 20.74.
However, 10 years later, it is significantly easier to move to the OUR (λ31 = 5.68) than to the
MUR (λ21 = 15.05) from the rural area. The migration probability from the data reveals the
same pattern: the rural population is equally likely to move to the two urban regions in 2005; fast-
forward to 2015, and the pattern shifts and the rural population is 250% more likely to migrate to
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the OUR.20
We note that λij is not directly observed in the data but rather inferred through the lens of our
model. However, our model does not assume that migration frictions are the most important driving
forces behind the observed migration pattern a priori. Instead, we include competing forces such as
productivity, amenity, and the urban costs in the model. Which forces explain the observed pattern
should be determined by the data and counter-factual analysis based on the calibrated model, as
we do in this and the next sections.
The drastic change in migration flows is unlikely to be driven by regional productivity, as we
see little regional convergence in productivity. Moreover, amenity in the MUR grew faster than that
in the OUR between the two periods, as seen in Table 3, implying that amenity alone would have
predicted the opposite pattern of that seen in 2015. Nevertheless, we also carry out counter-factual
analyses on productivity and amenity and confirm that these two factors have little explanatory
power on the observed migration pattern. The details are relegated to Appendix D. Therefore, the
contrast between the migration patterns in these two periods is likely to be explained by changes
in either migration friction or urban land markets (which are affected by land supply), or both. We
will further evaluate the relative importance of these two channels in the next section.
5 Quantitative Results
In this section, we carry out several counter-factual exercises to shed light on the impact of urban-
ization policy in China.
5.1 Impact of Differential Reform on Migration Restrictions
We first evaluate the impact of differential reform on migration restrictions by considering two
alternative urbanization policies. As discussed above, the baseline calibration in the year 2015
captures a basic migration pattern that is consistent with urbanization policy pivoting towards
small- and medium-sized cities. In the model, the emphasis towards smaller cities is reflected
in the λ matrix reported in Table 3: whereas migration costs from the rural region to the OUR drop
from 20.74 in 2005 to 5.68 in 2015, rural-MUR migration costs decline more mildly from 21.58 to
20From Table 1, 0.294/0.084− 1 ≈ 250%.
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15.05. As a result, during 2005–2015, out of the 37.8% of the rural population that emigrates, the
majority, 29.4%, goes to the smaller cities; only 8.4% chooses to move to large cities.
To evaluate the impact of such uneven reduction in migration costs, we simulate two counter-
factual cases. In the first exercise, hereafter referred to as the “λ∗ counter-factual”, we eliminate
the pivot towards the OUR by equalizing the rural-urban migration costs across the two urban
regions, e.g., setting λ31 = λ21 = λ∗. We pick the value of λ∗ so that the same 37.8% of the rural
population chooses to move out. In other words, we simulate a world in which the same number
of people move into the two urban areas facing the same migration friction. In practice, we find
λ∗ = 8.35; as a result, the inbound friction towards the large cities is relaxed, while the friction
into the small cities is tightened. In the second counter-factual analysis, referred to as the “low λ
counter-factual”, we equalize the two rural-urban migration friction to the lower value of the two,
so that λ31 = λ21 = min{λ31, λ21} = 5.68. The rationale behind this exercise is to extend the
more liberal migration policy to the rural-MUR migration as well. Note that as this exercise is an
overall relaxation of migration friction, we expect a higher volume of rural emigration and larger
overall welfare gain as well. In both counter-factual exercises, we simulate the model using all of
the other parameters from the 2015 quantification. The results are reported in the second and third
panels of Table 4, where the first panel presents the baseline in 2015 for comparison.
5.1.1 λ∗ counter-factual
We first focus on the λ∗ counter-factual in which the same number of people move out of the
rural region as compared to the baseline. Under the equalized migration costs, rural migrants
are more likely to move to the MUR, as reported in Panel (b) of Table 5. Unlike the baseline
case in Table 1, in the counter-factual simulation 22.1% of the rural population are now moving
into large cities, and 15.6% into smaller cities. This reverses the migration pattern empirically
observed as shown in Table 1(b). The re-directed migration flow is approximately 4.4% of the
total population.21 The popularity of the large cities is expected as it enjoys a higher productivity
and amenity. As a result of the re-directed migration flow, the population in the MUR increases by
0.6209/0.5209− 1 ≈ 19.2% whereas the population in the OUR drops by around 10.0%.
21Between the counter-factual and the baseline, 22.1− 8.4 = 13.7% of the rural emigrants are re-directed towards
the MUR. As the initial population in rural China is 0.7080, the re-directed flow is 0.137 ∗ 0.7080/2.1847 = 4.4%.
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China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015
Population 2.1847 0.6629 0.5209 1.0009 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2256 0.0609 0.2823 0.2347 0.2747 2.1750 6.8808 10.2857
Operating Firms 2.4687 - 1.2384 1.2303 - 190.8005 - 6231.7030
Exporting Firms 0.4261 - 0.2137 0.2123 - 11.6143 - 54.0165
λ21 = λ31 = λ
∗
Population 2.1847 0.6627 0.6209 0.9010 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2314 0.0620 0.2901 0.2380 0.2745 2.1734 6.9098 10.2743
Operating Firms 2.2755 - 1.3047 0.9708 - 185.2347 - 6051.6378
Exporting Firms 0.4376 - 0.2509 0.1867 - 11.2766 - 52.4507
Low λ
Population 2.1847 0.5766 0.6763 0.9317 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2608 0.0684 0.3081 0.2522 0.2749 2.1766 7.2183 10.2764
Operating Firms 1.6474 - 0.9658 0.6815 - 119.0079 - 3901.1131
Exporting Firms 0.3071 - 0.1800 0.1270 - 7.2535 - 33.7712
Low Growth of R̄MUR
Population 2.1847 0.6577 0.5348 0.9922 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2315 0.0614 0.2982 0.2357 0.2747 2.1752 6.9009 10.2854
Operating Firms 2.4075 - 1.2290 1.1784 - 185.5566 - 6061.7794
Exporting Firms 0.4191 - 0.2139 0.2051 - 11.2960 - 52.5395
Table 4: Impact of Urbanization Policies
Note: This table lists the key endogenous variables for all 7 regions across the baseline and the counter-factual simu-
lations. The first column is the aggregate result for China.
The national welfare is defined as the average of the region-level welfare, v̄im
−1/κ
ii , across the
regions in the country, weighted by the equilibrium regional population. Recall that v̄i is given in
Equation (16). The m−1/κii term appears as it captures the welfare loss due to migration frictions;
see Proposition 2 in Tombe and Zhu (2019).
The national welfare increases by 0.2314/0.2256 − 1 ≈ 2.6% by adopting the λ∗ policy. The
aggregate gain in welfare is substantial, considering the relatively modest change in migration flow
of 4.4% of the total population. The welfare also increases in all three regions in China. The MUR
enjoys a higher welfare due to the increased population base and market size, which in turn sup-
ports a higher number of operating firms and higher average productivity due to fiercer selection.
Even with a reduced population, the OUR still enjoys a higher welfare due to the spillover effect
from large cities. As labor supply concentrates in the high-productivity area, both intermediate
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Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.078 0.180
MUR (d) 0.084 0.894 0.079
OUR (d) 0.294 0.027 0.742
(a) Baseline 2015
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.077 0.180
MUR (d) 0.221 0.896 0.080
OUR (d) 0.156 0.027 0.740
(b) λ∗
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.484 0.082 0.190
MUR (d) 0.303 0.892 0.079
OUR (d) 0.213 0.027 0.731
(c) Low λ
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.619 0.073 0.179
MUR (d) 0.090 0.901 0.085
OUR (d) 0.291 0.026 0.737
(d) Low growth of R̄MUR
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.629 0.080 0.183
MUR (d) 0.082 0.892 0.078
OUR (d) 0.289 0.027 0.738
(e) Welfare-equivalent trade liberalization, λ∗
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.645 0.086 0.194
MUR (d) 0.078 0.887 0.077
OUR (d) 0.276 0.027 0.729
(f) Welfare-equivalent trade liberalization, low λ
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.079 0.184
MUR (d) 0.222 0.894 0.080
OUR (d) 0.155 0.027 0.736
(g) λ∗, autarky
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.507 0.089 0.205
MUR (d) 0.291 0.884 0.078
OUR (d) 0.203 0.027 0.718
(h) low λ, autarky
Table 5: Migration Probability Matrices in Counter-factual Simulations
Note: This table presents the migration probability matrix within China in various model simulations. An element at
the i-th row and the j-th column indicates the probability of an individual originating from j and moving to i. Each
column sums to 1.
and final consumption goods coming out of large cities become cheaper, which in turn benefits the
other two regions through intra-national trade.
The changes in urbanization policy also lead to ramifications around the world. After China
adopts the λ∗ policy, the population concentration in large cities lowers labor costs there. Chinese
exporters become more competitive in overseas markets and subsequently drive out inefficient
firms in these countries. As a result of this higher import competition, the number of operating
firms in ODC and ROW drops by around 2.9%.22 Similarly, the improved aggregate productivity
in China means that the Chinese market is harder to export to as well; correspondingly, the num-
221− 185.2/190.8 ≈ 2.9% in the ODC, and 1− 6051/6231 ≈ 2.9% in the ROW.
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bers of exporters in the ODC and ROW also decline by around the same magnitude. Apart from the
negative impact through import competition, a more productive China can also benefit the other
countries. Similar to the impacts on the OUR, a larger and more productive MUR provides the
foreign firms with cheaper intermediate inputs, and foreign consumers with cheaper consumption
goods. The presence of both forces in general leaves the welfare impacts on the other countries
ambiguous. In the quantification, we find that the welfare impacts on both ROW and ODC are
mostly negative but small. However, the impact in welfare for ROW is a quantitative result based
on the specific parameterization of the baseline and the counter-factual exercise, rather than a the-
oretical result from our model. In principle, the model is rich enough to allow for the urbanization
policy in China to either reduce or lift the welfare of other countries.
5.1.2 Low λ counter-factual
In the second counter-factual exercise, we extend the relatively liberal migration restrictions on
rural-OUR migration to the rural-MUR migration. In practice, this amounts to setting λ31 = λ21 =
5.68. The resulting migration pattern is reported in Panel (c) of Table 5; the welfare impacts are
shown in the third panel of Table 4.
The results are qualitatively similar to the previous exercise with the following notable differ-
ences. With lower migration costs to move out, an additional 0.622 − 0.484 = 13.8% of the rural
population migrates out as compared to the baseline and λ∗ cases. These additional emigrants
prefer to move into large cities, and as a result, the population of the large cities increases by
0.6763/0.5209−1 = 29.8% relative to the baseline, and 0.6763/0.6209−1 = 8.9% relative to the
λ∗ counter-factual. The further concentration of the workforce in the MUR leads to a more sub-
stantial welfare gain in all three regions, and a national welfare gain of 0.2608/0.2256 = 15.6%.
Relative to the gain in the λ∗ counter-factual, the further relaxation of migration restrictions results
in a much higher welfare improvement.
In the global context, the negative impacts on foreign firms are intensified compared to the
λ∗ case: around one third of the operating firms in ODC and ROW are driven out of business.
The numbers of exporting firms in the two foreign economies also face a downfall of a similar
magnitude. Conversely, these results echo the idea that differential reforms that restrain the growth
of large and productive cities may cause firms to move to foreign countries, as emphasized in the
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introduction.
Second, the welfare impacts outside of China are much richer. In the ODC, both the rural and
urban welfare is slightly higher in the counter-factual by a small margin. As mentioned earlier,
the positive impact in urban welfare is possible in the model if the benefits from cheaper imports
outweigh the loss from import competition.
Lastly, the rural welfare in the ROW improves by 7.22/6.88 − 1 = 4.9% whereas the urban
welfare drops slightly. These changes in welfare are driven mainly by trade in agriculture goods.
Under the low λ policy, people move out of the rural region in China, subsequently reducing the
agriculture supply; as the migrants earn a higher wage in urban China, the agriculture demand from
China surges. These two forces jointly push up the price of food in the international market, and
in turn benefit the producers (the rural region) at the expense of the consumers (the urban region)
in foreign countries, as we have seen in the ROW. This impact is absent in the ODC because it is
not actively trading with China in the agriculture market, as its agriculture productivity is similar
to the level of China, as reported in Table 3a.
5.2 Urban Land Rents
As discussed in Section 4.3, other than the migration policy, the changes in urban land rents can
also potentially explain the changes in migration patterns between 2005 and 2015. To evaluate the
impacts of this channel, we carry out the following counter-factual simulation.
In the baseline quantification, the outside values of land in the MUR grew much faster than the
OUR between 2005 and 2015. In 2005, the R̄i in the MUR (124.24) is only 2.4 times higher than
that in the OUR (51.65). However, in 2015, the R̄i in the MUR (657.16) is already more than five
times higher than that in the OUR (125.15). A high land rent that deters immigration could result
from the stringent land supply, as well as other factors, in the MUR. To evaluate the impacts of the
surging land rents in the MUR, we carry out a “low growth of R̄MUR” counterfactual in which we
set the ratios of R̄i between the MUR and OUR in 2015 to be the same as in the year 2005. This
is done by setting R̄MUR = 301.04 while keeping R̄OUR = 125.15, the same as in the baseline. All
of the other parameters of the model are the same as in the baseline. The migration patterns of the
counter-factual exercise are reported in Table 5, and the welfare impacts in Table 4.
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It turns out that the rapid appreciation of land rents can hardly explain the observed migration
pattern. As reported in Panel (d) of Table 5, depressing the high land rents in the MUR only
increases its inflow from the rural areas by 0.6% to 9.0%. Meanwhile, the rural migrants still
predominately prefer the OUR with a 29.1% migration probability.
5.3 Comparing Urbanization Policies with Trade Policies
In Section 5.1, we evaluated the economic impact of the differential reforms on migration friction
by simulating two alternative urbanization policies. In this subsection, we compare the urbaniza-
tion policies to another major category of economic policy: trade policies. Urbanization policies
and trade policies target different margins of economic activity: the former concerns the movement
of labor while the latter focuses on the mobility of goods. The comparison between the two puts
urbanization policies in a familiar perspective based on the vast literature on trade liberalization.
Table 6 summarizes all the results, in which we replicate the baseline results in year 2015 in the
first panel for ease of exposition.
China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015
Population 2.1847 0.6629 0.5209 1.0009 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2256 0.0609 0.2823 0.2347 0.2747 2.1750 6.8808 10.2857
Operating Firms 2.4687 - 1.2384 1.2303 - 190.8005 - 6231.7030
Exporting Firms 0.4261 - 0.2137 0.2123 - 11.6143 - 54.0165
Trade Liberalization, λ∗
Population 2.1847 0.6722 0.5187 0.9938 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2314 0.0636 0.2896 0.2408 0.2750 2.1776 6.7820 10.2999
Operating Firms 2.0743 - 1.0420 1.0324 - 159.7666 - 5210.8982
Exporting Firms 0.4149 - 0.2084 0.2065 - 9.7212 - 45.1868
Trade Liberalization, low λ
Population 2.1847 0.6980 0.5127 0.9740 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2608 0.0750 0.3267 0.2717 0.2765 2.1890 6.4633 10.3540
Operating Firms 1.1092 - 0.5593 0.5499 - 82.8352 - 2688.9079
Exporting Firms 0.3695 - 0.1863 0.1832 - 5.0336 - 23.3476
Table 6: Comparing Urbanization Policies with Trade Policies
Note: This table lists the key endogenous variables for all 7 regions across the baseline and the counter-factual simu-
lations. The first column is the aggregate result for China.
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The previous subsection has shown that the λ∗ policy, in which the rural-urban migration fric-
tions are equalized while keeping constant the total emigration of the rural population, delivers a
2.6% gain in national welfare. To put this welfare gain into perspective, we solve for a level of
trade liberalization that delivers the same 2.6% gain in national welfare. We implement the trade
liberalization as uniform reduction in τij where either i or j (but not both) is a region in China.
In other words, we reduce the variable trade costs in and out of China by a certain percentage,
while keeping the trade costs constant everywhere else. All the other parameters, including the
migration costs, are kept the same as in the baseline model. The results are presented in the second
panel of Table 6. The goal of such an exercise is to find what the λ∗ policy amounts to in terms
of percentage reduction in bilateral variable trade cost. We carry out a similar exercise to find the
level of trade liberalization that delivers a 15.6% improvement in national welfare, the same as in
the “low λ” urbanization policy; the results are reported in the third panel of the same table.
The welfare impacts of the urbanization policies are equivalent to substantial reductions in
trade friction. To achieve the same level of national welfare improvements in the λ∗ counter-
factual, China must reduce the bilateral variable trade costs by 5.8%; the equivalent of the “low
λ” policy calls for a whopping 24.6% reduction in bilateral iceberg trade costs.23 These levels of
trade liberalizations are notable; by our own calculation based on the ESCAP-World Bank Trade
Costs Database, China only lowered its average variable trade costs by 5.1% during 1996–2006,
which was when it entered the World Trade Organization (at the end of 2001) and when tariffs
were substantially reduced.
The welfare-equivalent trade liberalization is sizable because trade induces only a mild re-
sponse in internal migration, as evident by comparing the migration matrices reported in Panels
(e) and (f) of Table 5 with the data in Table 1. As a large fraction of the population remains in the
low-income rural region under trade liberalization, the overall reduction in trade friction must be
large enough to achieve the same level of national welfare improvements in the alternative urban-
ization policies. In comparison, alternative urbanization policies work by diverting the population
into high-productivity regions, improving national welfare.
23A 5.8% reduction in bilateral trade costs reduces the iceberg trade costs between China and the ODC from 2.46
to (2.46− 1) ∗ (1− 0.058) + 1 = 2.38. Note that the reduction of τij is towards 1, not towards 0, because τij = 1 is
the limit case of free trade. The other cases are computed in a similar manner.
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5.4 Role of International Trade
To understand the role of international trade in the effects of urbanization policy, we re-calibrate the
model to the autarky case and re-do the two counter-factual urbanization policies. Comparing these
results to the counter-factual simulations under trade offers insight into the interactions between
trade and migration. The resulting migration matrices are reported in the last two panels of Table
5 and the welfare results in Table 7.
China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015, Autarky
Population 2.1847 0.6630 0.5209 1.0008 - - - -
Welfare 0.2005 0.0336 0.2642 0.2185 - - - -
Operating Firms 81.6703 - 41.0766 40.5937 - - - -
Exporting Firms 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 - - - -
λ21 = λ31 = λ
∗, Autarky
Population 2.1847 0.6681 0.6202 0.8964 - - - -
Welfare 0.2060 0.0348 0.2717 0.2217 - - - -
Operating Firms 68.5687 - 39.4698 29.0989 - - - -
Exporting Firms 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 - - - -
Low λ, Autarky
Population 2.1847 0.6122 0.6627 0.9098 - - - -
Welfare 0.2279 0.0395 0.2849 0.2321 - - - -
Operating Firms 37.8253 - 22.2478 15.5775 - - - -
Exporting Firms 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 - - - -
Table 7: Impacts of Urbanization Policies under Autarky
Note: This table lists the key endogenous variables for China under the autarky simulation, in which we reduce the
model to contain only China. The first column is the aggregate result for China.
International trade increases the overall level of emigration from the rural area. In the low-λ
policy in which the entire country adopts a more liberal migration policy, fewer rural migrants
choose to move to the urban regions in autarky. In the baseline low-λ simulation, 48.4% of the
rural workers choose to stay, and in the autarky-low-λ case, this number increases to 50.7%. The
urban regions are less attractive to rural migrants due to the loss of labor demand from exports. The
reduced rural-to-urban migration flow also reduces the welfare gain of the low-λ policy reduces to
0.2279/0.2005 - 1 = 13.7%. International trade acting as a magnet that draws rural workers into
urban regions is also documented in Fan (2019).
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However, the relative flows of rural emigrants to the two urban regions change little. In the
autarky-low-λ case, the fraction of rural emigrants to the MUR is 29.1/(100-50.7)=59.0%; this
fraction in the baseline low-λ case is 58.7%. By construction, the λ∗ counter-factual fixes the total
rural emigration, but the same negligible difference in the relative flows between autarky and trade
is readily verified. As the spatial distribution of population in the autarky-λ∗ case changes little
from the baseline-λ∗ case, the welfare gains of the λ∗ policy remain similar.
5.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present four robustness checks. In the first, we use a higher migration elasticity,
κ, and in the second one, a higher ε to capture a world with weaker market power. In the third
exercise, we experiment with a higher expenditure share of land consumption, and in the last, we
shut down the channel of entry and exit of firms. In all the exercises, we re-calibrate the migration
frictions and the fixed costs of entry, and report these parameters in Table 8. The main welfare
results are reported in Tables 9 and 10, and the migration probabilities in Table 11.
5.5.1 Higher Migration Elasticity
In the baseline quantification of the model we use a migration elasticity of κ = 1.63. Although
our choice of κ lies within the range of common estimates between 1.4 and 3.3 in the literature, it
nevertheless is closer to the lower end. As a robustness check, we re-calibrate {λij} and fe in the
year 2015 using κ = 3.3 from Monte et al. (2018), the estimate on the higher end.
A higher migration elasticity implies that the estimated λij are smaller in levels and less dis-
persed, as evidenced by comparing Tables 3 and 8. The key pattern is still preserved in the case
with higher κ: in 2015, it is significantly harder to move from the rural regions to the large cities
(λ21 = 8.06) than to the smaller ones (λ31 = 4.50). The impacts of the alternative urbanization
policies are qualitatively similar but quantitatively larger. Adopting the λ∗ policy leads to 3.0%,
and the “low λ” policy, a 18.2% increase in national welfare. These numbers are to be compared
with the 2.6% and 15.6% welfare gains in the baseline. The welfare gains are higher here because
the migration flows are more sensitive to the changes in λij in a world with a high elasticity.
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Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 1.00 0.48 0.43
MUR (d) 8.06 1.00 2.42
OUR (d) 4.50 2.35 1.00
fe 10.67
(a) Higher Migration Elasticity, κ = 3.3
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 1.00 0.70 0.49
MUR (d) 21.88 1.00 5.15
OUR (d) 7.79 6.53 1.00
fe 10.75
(b) Higher Elasticity of Substitution, ε = 10.0
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 1.00 5.16 2.36
MUR (d) 2.97 1.00 3.39
OUR (d) 1.61 9.93 1.00
fe 10.16
(c) Higher Expenditure Share of Land Consump-
tion, 1− α− γ = 0.25
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 1.00 1.06 0.64
MUR (d) 14.33 1.00 4.48
OUR (d) 5.92 7.69 1.00
fe -
(d) Fixed Entry
Table 8: Robustness Checks, the Re-Calibrated Parameters: fe and {λij}
Note: This table reports the jointly calibrated parameters in the robustness checks. The other parameters are the same
as in the 2015 baseline model.
5.5.2 Higher Elasticity of Substitution
In the baseline model, we jointly calibrate ε and θ to match a trade elasticity of 4 and a tail-index
of firm-size distribution of 1.076. The resulting ε = 4.717 implies an average markup of 27%. In
the robustness check, we increase the elasticity of substitution to ε = 10.0 so the market structure
is closer to perfect competition with a markup of 11% while the trade elasticity, θ, is reset to 9.684
to match the tail-index of 1.076. The new values of ε and θ remain in the ballpark of the estimates
from the gravity-equation literature.
With a lower markup, the real income level in all cases improves substantially, as lower market
power increases the firms’ equilibrium output. In this framework in which there is a differentiated
sector with positive markups and a rural sector with zero markups, the equilibrium allocation is
always sub-optimal as the allocation of labor to urban regions is less than optimal. A reduction in
market power in the differentiated sector reduces this allocative inefficiency and implies a larger
rural-urban migration.24 However, to keep migration flows as the observed ones, the re-calibrated
rural-to-urban migration frictions would be higher than the baseline ones. This is apparent from
24For the economics underlying allocative inefficiency due to variable markups, see, for example, Holmes et al.
(2014) and Arkolakis et al. (2019).
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China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015, κ = 3.3
Population 2.1847 0.6624 0.5210 1.0013 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2084 0.0610 0.2824 0.2347 0.2748 2.1754 6.8823 10.2875
λ21 = λ31 = λ
∗, κ = 3.3
Population 2.1847 0.6630 0.6473 0.8744 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2146 0.0619 0.2901 0.2375 0.2731 2.1623 6.8726 10.2083
Low λ, κ = 3.3
Population 2.1847 0.5669 0.7269 0.8908 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2463 0.0697 0.3137 0.2554 0.2748 2.1761 7.2709 10.2712
(a) Higher Migration Elasticity
China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015, ε = 10.0
Population 2.1847 0.6630 0.5209 1.0008 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.6645 0.1326 0.8926 0.6995 0.3537 2.7049 8.6927 11.0932
λ21 = λ31 = λ
∗, ε = 10.0
Population 2.1847 0.6655 0.6241 0.8951 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.6767 0.1347 0.9023 0.7037 0.3536 2.7040 8.7577 11.0844
Low λ, ε = 10.0
Population 2.1847 0.5853 0.6797 0.9197 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.7368 0.1460 0.9217 0.7186 0.3537 2.7049 9.1854 11.0594
(b) Higher Elasticity of Substitution
Table 9: Robustness Checks: Results I
Note: This table lists the key endogenous variables for all 7 regions across the baseline and the counter-factual simu-
lations. The first column is the aggregate result for China.
comparing Tables 3g and 8. Similarly, the urban-to-rural migration frictions are lower than the
baseline ones.
The λ∗ and the low-λ counterfactuals lead to the slightly lower welfare gains of 1.8% and
10.9%. In this framework, the elasticity of welfare to the allocation of labor is tied closely to the
elasticity of substitution, which inversely reflects the love of variety. In the λ∗ counter-factual,
labor reallocation from the OUR to the MUR still brings welfare gains, but such gains become
smaller when ε is higher because the new varieties that come with the inflow of population to the
MUR are less valuable to consumers there. A similar logic applies to the low-λ counter-factual.
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China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015, high expenditure share of land consumption
Population 2.1847 0.6629 0.5209 1.0008 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.3728 0.2975 0.2719 0.3237 1.4121 4.5223 16.6967 17.7111
λ21 = λ31 = λ
∗, high expenditure share of land consumption
Population 2.1847 0.6636 0.5799 0.9412 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.3746 0.3012 0.2758 0.3264 1.4111 4.5192 16.7040 17.6872
Low λ, high expenditure share of land consumption
Population 2.1847 0.6185 0.6005 0.9657 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.3991 0.3174 0.2858 0.3385 1.4126 4.5238 16.9206 17.6325
(a) Higher Expenditure Share of Land Consumption
China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015, fixed entry
Population 2.1847 0.6600 0.5168 1.0078 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.3319 0.0889 0.3890 0.3586 0.4179 3.2927 10.8556 15.8012
λ21 = λ31 = λ
∗, fixed entry
Population 2.1847 0.6589 0.5849 0.9409 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.3312 0.0892 0.3734 0.3682 0.4177 3.2913 10.8619 15.7932
Low λ, fixed entry
Population 2.1847 0.5968 0.6178 0.9700 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.3478 0.0935 0.3717 0.3697 0.4173 3.2885 11.0922 15.7584
(b) Fixed Entry
Table 10: Robustness Checks: Results II
Note: This table lists the key endogenous variables for all 7 regions across the baseline and the counter-factual simu-
lations. The first column is the aggregate result for China.
This pattern is similar to Ma and Tang (2020b), who also document declining gains from migration
as the elasticity of substitution increases.
5.5.3 Higher Expenditure Share of Land Consumption
In the baseline model, the expenditure share of land consumption, 1 − α − γ, is set to 0.0625
following Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011) and Combes et al. (2019), as explained in Section 4.2.1.
As this paper does not explicitly model housing structure, which is treated as part of the differen-
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Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.075 0.181
MUR (d) 0.254 0.898 0.082
OUR (d) 0.124 0.026 0.737
(a) λ∗, High Migration Elasticity
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.447 0.086 0.203
MUR (d) 0.373 0.889 0.081
OUR (d) 0.180 0.026 0.716
(b) Low λ, High Migration Elasticity
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.079 0.182
MUR (d) 0.229 0.894 0.079
OUR (d) 0.149 0.027 0.739
(c) λ∗, High Elasticity of Substitution
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.483 0.086 0.197
MUR (d) 0.314 0.887 0.077
OUR (d) 0.204 0.027 0.726
(d) Low λ, High Elasticity of Substitution
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.078 0.180
MUR (d) 0.166 0.895 0.079
OUR (d) 0.212 0.027 0.740
(e) λ∗, High Expenditure Share of Land Consump-
tion
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.551 0.080 0.184
MUR (d) 0.196 0.893 0.079
OUR (d) 0.252 0.027 0.737
(f) Low λ, High Expenditure Share of Land Con-
sumption
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.607 0.059 0.177
MUR (d) 0.111 0.920 0.105
OUR (d) 0.282 0.020 0.718
(g) Low growth of R̄MUR, High Expenditure Share
of Land Consumption
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.619 0.073 0.179
MUR (d) 0.090 0.901 0.085
OUR (d) 0.291 0.026 0.737
(h) Low growth of R̄MUR, Baseline
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.085 0.173
MUR (d) 0.193 0.885 0.069
OUR (d) 0.184 0.030 0.758
(i) λ∗, Fixed Entry
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.515 0.092 0.184
MUR (d) 0.246 0.878 0.067
OUR (d) 0.238 0.031 0.749
(j) Low λ, Fixed Entry
Table 11: Robustness Checks: Migration Probability Matrices
Note: This table presents the migration probability matrix within China in various robustness checks. An element at
the i-th row and the j-th column indicates the probability of an individual originating from j and moving to i. Each
column sums to 1.
tiated goods, we consider this number an appropriate one to use. The finding that households are
not entirely responsive to land prices may be likely because this expenditure share is low. Thus, we
conduct a robustness check by experimenting with a higher expenditure share at 0.25, which can
be considered on the high end of possible values of the expenditure share of land consumption.
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With a higher weight on land consumption, the MUR and OUR’s high land prices deter rural
migrants. As a result, the estimated rural-to-urban migration frictions drastically decline to λ31 =
2.97, and λ21 = 1.61. Nevertheless, the migration barriers into the MUR are still higher than that
into the OUR, reflecting the discriminatory urbanization policy. We first repeat the “low growth
of R̄MUR” counterfactual exercise. Naturally, we find that rural emigrants are more responsive to
the changes in land prices than the baseline model. With a lower growth rate of R̄MUR, the rural-
to-MUR migration probability increased to 11.1% as shown in Table 11. In comparison, in the
baseline model, the same probability is only 9.0%.
Our main results are robust to this alternative parameterization. The λ∗ and low-λ policies
still divert a significant proportion of the rural emigrants towards the MUR (see Table 11[e,f]).
However, the magnitudes are smaller than the baseline case (see Table 5[b,c]). Importantly, the
alternative urbanization policies are still more effective in re-directing the population flows than
depressing the growth rates of R̄MUR. This is evident from comparing Panels (e) and (f) with Panel
(g) in Table 11.
Lastly, the welfare impacts of the alternative urbanization policies become relatively mild. As
shown in Table 10, the improvements of national welfare under the λ∗ and low-λ policies are
reduced to 0.5% and 7.1%, respectively. This is because the alternative policies attract a smaller
fraction of the rural emigrants into the more productive MUR if the individuals care more about
land consumption.
5.5.4 Fixed Entry
The firm-entry margin is instrumental to the punchline result that a more uniform or laissez-faire
migration policy improves national welfare. To highlight the role of firm entry in our model, we
shut down the firms’ entry-and-exit channel. In the baseline model, Ij potential firms pay the entry
fee fe, and we need to solve for Ij in the general equilibrium. For the “fixed entry” model, we
assume that Īj is exogenously given at a level that will be specified later, and the entry cost fe is
assumed to be zero. Without the firm-entry margin, the aggregate profit becomes positive (instead
of zero in the baseline model). Regional aggregate profits are evenly rebated to individuals in
that region. In the new version, we provide the details of solving the model in this new setup in
Appendix B.7.
48
To study the effect of entry on migration, we compute Īj’s used in all fixed-entry exercises
from the pre-migration equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium under the initial population and before
people move. In practice, this is computed from the baseline model with free entry and prohibitive
migration costs (λij =∞, i 6= j). Then, any equilibrium with the fixed Īj’s is a world in which the
number of entrants no longer responds to population flows.
The estimated λij’s reported in Table 8 are similar to the baseline case, in which the barriers
to the MUR are significantly higher than those to the OUR. Similarly, the λ∗ exercise also leads
to a pronounced shift of the rural emigrants towards the MUR, although the magnitude is slightly
smaller. See Table 11(i) and compare it with Table 5(b).
Nevertheless, the welfare impacts of alternative policies are drastically different. In the fixed-
entry model, the MUR suffers lower welfare when more rural migrants flow into the large cities in
the λ∗ exercise. As a result, national welfare drops. This is in stark contrast with the result in the
baseline model in which all regional and national welfare increases. As this result in the baseline
model is the paper’s punchline, this exercise under the fixed-entry model highlights the importance
of the entry margin. Under the fixed mass of firms, inflows of people no longer increase the number
of varieties in the destination market; instead, they only push down the factor prices, push up the
land prices, and eventually reduce local welfare. The importance of firm entry in the context of
migration is already highlighted in Ma and Tang (2020b), and this robustness check resonates with
their finding.
The result in the low-λ policy is similar in terms of the directions of changes in regional welfare,
but the national welfare still improves as the overall migration frictions are lowered. All of the
welfare results of the two alternative migration policies are reported in Table 10(b).
6 Conclusion
This paper documents a striking contrast in the migration patterns between years 2005 and 2015:
whereas the migration probability of a rural individual to mega cities is higher than that to smaller
cities in 2005, the opposite is true in 2015. Such a reversal in the migration pattern is consistent
with the differential reforms to the hukou system that encourage rural people to move into small-
and medium-sized cities and restrain the growth of large cities.
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In our quantitative analysis, we find that equalizing migration costs between rural-MUR and
rural-OUR migration while keeping the total emigration of the rural population unchanged results
in welfare gains of 2.6%. This is substantial, considering that it involves reallocating a mere 4.4%
of the total population. We also find that a more laissez-faire urbanization policy that equalizes the
rural-MUR migration cost to the rural-OUR one results in welfare gains of 15.6%. The welfare
gains under the two alternative urbanization policies amount to what would result from 5.8% and
24.6% reductions in bilateral variable trade costs, respectively. Based on the ESCAP-World Bank
Trade Costs Database, China only lowered its average iceberg trade costs by 5.1% during 1996–
2006, which was when it entered the World Trade Organization (at the end of 2001) and tariffs were
substantially reduced. Namely, an alternative urbanization policy that treats large and small cities
equally while keeping the total rural emigration the same increases welfare by a similar magnitude
to the trade liberalization that it has accomplished in the past. China can gain even more with a
more laissez-faire urbanization policy.
Recall that our welfare results are conservative estimates because of the relatively low mi-
gration elasticity adopted in the baseline. As shown in Section 5.5, the welfare gains increase
substantially if the migration elasticity is higher.
Our quantitative analyses are, of course, specific to our model. However, our model is mostly
standard. For the sake of tractability, the model does not incorporate agglomeration forces in cities
despite the idiosyncratic locational preferences and the urban costs being dispersion forces. It
would be an interesting extension to incorporate agglomeration forces; if the net effect is positive,
i.e., some sorts of increasing returns at the city level exist, the message of this paper would become
even stronger because the large, productive urban centers in the MUR would become all the more
important in enhancing aggregate welfare.
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ARG CHE∗ DNK∗ HRV JPN∗ MEX POL SWE∗
AUS∗ CHL ESP HUN KAZ MLT PRT THA
AUT∗ CHN EST IDN KHM MYS ROU TUN
BEL∗ COL FIN∗ IND KOR NLD∗ RUS TUR
BGR CRI FRA∗ IRL∗ LTU NOR∗ SAU∗ USA∗
BRA CYP GBR∗ ISL∗ LUX∗ NZL SGP∗ VNM
BRN∗ CZE GRC ISR LVA PER SVK ZAF
CAN∗ DEU∗ HKG∗ ITA∗ MAR PHL SVN
Table A.1: Country List
Note: This table lists all the countries in the quantitative exercise. The countries with a star are included in the ROW;
those without, except for China, are included in the ODC. The reported codes are the ISO 3166 alpha-3 country codes.
More details can be found at https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html.
Beijing Tianjin Shijiazhuang Shenyang
Haerbin Shanghai Nanjing Suzhou
Hangzhou Ningbo Wenzhou Qingdao
Zhengzhou Wuhan Guangzhou Shenzhen
Foshan Dongguan Chongqing Chengdu
Xi’an
Table A.2: Cities in the MUR
Note: This table lists all the prefecture-level cities that are included in the MUR. These are the cities with an urban
population greater than 5 million in the 2010 census. All the other prefecture cities are grouped into the OUR.
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B Model Solution
The equilibrium conditions in the model can be described as a system of nonlinear equations
in which {wj, Ij, Pj, Nj} are the endogenous variables to be solved. We solve the system of
equations with iterations: in the current iteration, the system of equations implies new values of
{wj, Ij, Pj, Nj} as functions of the current values. The algorithm continues until the current and
implied values of endogenous variables converge under a pre-specified tolerance level, 1.0E-6. In
this appendix, we describe the equations and rules to update each variable above. Before venturing
into each variable in detail, we define notation and highlight conditions that will be used across the
entire algorithm.
Notations
1. In describing the iterative method, we denote the values in the current iteration as x, and the
implied values as x′.
2. We define the set of the urban locations as U and the rural locations as R with the under-
standing that U ∪R covers all the locations, and U ∩R = ∅.
3. For computational reasons, we use the Υ matrix to denote a combination of trade costs. The
















Income The free-entry condition implies that the total profit in each urban region is zero. As a
result, the total income in region j is the labor income inclusive of land rents, (wj +Tc)Nj , where c
is the country to which j belongs. The total income in the rural regions adopts the same expression
due to the perfectly competitive agriculture market.
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where j is the rural region in country c. The aggregate land rent is then computed as
Tc =
















+ 1− α− γ
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Expenditure Out of the total income, a fraction γ is spent on differentiated goods by consumers.
Moreover, firms also demand differentiated products as inputs in both urban and rural regions.
As a result, the total expenditure on differentiated products, Xj , comes from both parts in urban
locations. In the urban regions, the expenditure can be expressed as
Xj = γ(wj + Tc)Nj + (1− β)Xj =
γ
β
(wj + Tc)Nj, j ∈ U . (B.2)
The inputs to produceXj worth of differentiated products equal (1−β)Xj . This observation relies
on the fact that the total profit in the differentiated sector equals zero, so that the total revenue
equals the total costs in region j.
In rural regions, Xj depends on consumer demand and the demand from the agriculture sector:
Xj = γ(wj + Tc)Nj +
1− ν − η
ν
wjNj. (B.3)
The second term in the expression above captures the demand from the agriculture sector. Note
that the total input costs of the agriculture sector must be wjNj/ν in equilibrium, and a fraction
1− ν − η of the costs is used to purchase intermediate inputs.
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The expenditure on the agriculture products is XAj = α(wj + Tc)Nj in each location j.
The total expenditure of the country c, Xc, is the summation of the expenditures of all the
regions: Xc =
∑
j∈Jc Xj , where Jc is the set of regions in country c.
B.1 Updating Pj














































































































Note that due to the assumption of free internal trade, the price level only varies at the country










































































































































































B.3 Updating wj in the Urban Regions
The total income in an urban region j is the sum from two parts. The first part is the value-added
from the differentiated sector, which is the sales to all the urban and the rural regions, minus the
costs of the intermediate products. The second part is the residential land rent, which is a fraction
of the total income:






Xij − (1− β)Xj + (1− α− γ)(wj + Tc)Nj.
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In the above equation, the LHS is the total income. The trade balance condition between the rural
and urban regions also implies that the total sales to the rural regions must be the same as the total
imports of food, and therefore
∑
i∈RXij = α(wj +Tc)Nj . Substitute this into the equation above:




Substitute in the expression of Xj from equation (B.2):
γ(wj + Tc)Nj + (1− β)
γ
β










In the end, substitute in the solution of urban-to-urban trade flows from equation (B.6):
γ
β




































(wi + Tc(i))Ni. (B.7)
B.4 Updating wj in the Rural Regions
The wage rates in the rural areas, on the other hand, are determined through the market clearing
condition in the agriculture market. We first note that given a rural wage, wj , and a price index of


























The wage rate in rural China is the numeraire in our model, and therefore we must solve for the
two other rural wage rates to clear the market. The market clearing condition is characterized by
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the following two equations:
1. If country c does not engage in the international trade in the agricultural products, e.g, all the
rural and the urban regions in country c buy agricultural products only from their own rural
region, and its rural region sells only domestically, then the rural wage rate, wj , is determined























In this equation, wiNi is the total labor income of the rural region, set Jc is the set of the
regions that belongs to country c. The terms in the square bracket on the left-hand side
(RHS) of the equation is the total expenditure on agricultural goods of all the regions in
country c, and ν captures the share of the expenditure that goes to the rural workers.
In the expression above, Tc is also a function of the rural wage, wj . Rearrange the equation
and substitute in the expression of Tc from equation (B.1), we can express the rural wage
rate as a function of the urban wage rates:
(1− αν)
αν














+ 1− α− γ
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2. If country c imports agricultural products from country d, then the agricultural input costs









The LHS is the price of domestic agricultural products in country c, and the RHS is the price









as it would imply










implies that the rural region in country c cannot offer a competitive price in its own market
despite the trade barrier. If the inequality were true, we could then infer that all the regions
in the world would find the price from country d to be lower than the price from country c,
and thus the demand for the agriculture goods in country c would drop to zero. This cannot
happen in equilibrium because there will always be a strictly positive supply of agricultural
products due to the existence of idiosyncratic location preferences.
The above conditions fully characterize the solution to the market clearing conditions in the agri-
cultural market, conditional on a given set of trade relationships (e.g., who imports from whom).
In practice, given our 3-country setup, as there is a small number of possible trade relationships,
we use a guess-and-verify method to find the equilibrium trade relationships and the corresponding
wage rates in the rural regions.
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B.5 Updating Ij
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Denote the LHS matrix as AA and the RHS vector as BB ; the above equation provides a solution
to the vector (Pj)
θ:
(Pj)
θ = AA−1 ∗ BB
Note that from equation (B.4), we have another solution of price, which we denote as (Pj)
θ = DD .






















































































After some manipulation and simplification:
(µ1)
−θ 0 · · · 0
0 (µ2)
−θ · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
























ε−1 0 · · · 0
0 (X2)
θ
ε−1 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...













































































































Denoting the RHS matrix on the first line with elements Υij (µj)
θ (χj)
− θε−ε+1
ε−1 as Ψ, we can re-write



























Denote the LHS vector as











































































Nj is directly updated using equation (17), conditional on the solution of wj, Pj , and Ij .
B.7 Fixed Entry
Profits In the special case of “fixed entry”, we set the mass of entrants in each region to an
exogenous level, denoted as Īj . In this case, the firms earn profits, which will be distributed back
to all the residents living in region j, including immigrants. The profit of a firm originating in j
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and selling to i with a productivity a is:
πij(a)− χjfij.
































































Denote the aggregate profit in region j as Ξj , it is then straightforward to see that the aggregate













Expenditure The expenditure on the differentiated goods in the urban region adopts a new ex-
pression as well:






Different from the expression in the baseline model, the total income in the urban region becomes











Xj is the aggregate costs of all the firms in region j. Simplify
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the goods market clearing condition:
Xj = γ
[











= γ(wj + Tc)Nj +
[
1− β + ε− 1
θε
(γ − (1− β))
]
Xj[
β − ε− 1
θε
(γ − (1− β))
]






(γ − (1− β))
(wj + Tc)Nj. (B.11)
Note that the above equation implies a parameter restriction that β− ε−1
θε
(γ − (1− β)) > 0, which
is met in all the specifications in the paper.
Income Taking the expression of total expenditure in equation (B.11), the total income in the j
becomes:














































Land Rents Lastly, the aggregate land rent is now computed as:
Tc =
RA,cLA,c + (1− α− γ)
[∑
i∈Jc∩U [(wi + Tc)Ni + Ξi] +
∑




Simplify the expression, and use j to index the rural region in country c:
Tc =
ην−1wjNj + (1− α− γ)
[∑




ην−1wjNj + (1− α− γ)
[∑
i∈Jc∩U ρwiNi + wjNj
]
N̄c





ην−1wjNj + (1− α− γ)
[∑
i∈Jc∩U ρwiNi + wjNj
][







Urban Wage The algorithm to solve the urban wage rates is not affected. To see this, first note
that the urban income accounting becomes:











Xj + (1− α− γ) [(wj + Tc)Nj + Ξi] .
In the expression above, the LHS is the total income in j, and the RHS is the income source.
The first part is the value-added from the differentiated sector, which is the sales to all the urban
and the rural regions, minus the costs of the intermediate products. The second part of the land
rent. Similar to the baseline model, trade balance with the rural regions implies
∑
i∈RXij =
α[(wj + Tc)Nj + Ξj], which leads to:









Substitute in the expression of Ξj and Xj from equation (B.11):








(γ − (1− β))







(γ − (1− β))





Substitute in the expression of Xij from equation (B.6), we arrive at the same solution as in the
baseline model as in equation (B.7).
Rural Wage If country c engages in international trade in the agricultural products, then its rural
wage rate is still implicitly pinned down by equation (B.9), the same as in the baseline model. In







ρ (wi + Tc)Ni
)
+ α(wj + Tc)Nj
]





ρ (wi + Tc)Ni
]
.
Substitute in the modified expression of Tc:
1− αν
αν
wjNj = TcNj +
∑
i∈Jc∩U













ην−1wjNj + (1− α− γ)
[∑
i∈Jc∩U ρwiNi + wjNj
]
N̄c − (1− α− γ)
(∑
i∈Jc∩U ρNi +Nj
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Price Index and Trade Flow The expressions in these parts are not affected by shutting down
firm entry.
C Data and Quantification
This appendix provides the details regarding the data sources and the quantification of the model.
We organize the discussion by data source.
C.1 Data Sources, Global
The World Development Indicators We use several components of the WDI. For the following
variables, we take the average value between 2000 and 2005 for the equilibrium in the year 2005,
and the average between 2010 and 2015 for the equilibrium in the year 2015:
• The employment in agriculture variable (SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS) is used to infer the rural pop-
ulation.
• The cereal production data (AG.PRD.CREL.MT) is used to infer the agriculture productivity.
• The time required to start a business variable (IC.REG.DURS) is used to infer the fixed costs
of operation, fi.
The Penn World Table We use the 9.1 version of the PWT in this paper. Our measure of
population (pop) comes from the PWT. We use the average population between 2000 and 2005 for
the 2005 calibration, and the average between 2010 and 2015 for the 2015 calibration.
The differentiation between the ROW and the ODC is based on the per capita GDP, which we
define as “rgdpo/pop”, averaged between 2000 and 2015. A country with average per capita GDP
less than 2/3 of the USA is defined as ODC.
The cross-sectional TFP used to calibrate urban productivity is the variable “ctfp”, and the
inter-temporal TFP used to calibrate the growth of urban productivity between 2005 and 2015 is
“rtfpna”.
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The OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Tables We use the 2018 version of the ICIO tables to
infer the bilateral trade flow matrix between the three countries, which is in turn used to compute
the variable trade costs. The 2018 version provides annual data from the year 2005 to 2015; we
use the data from respective years for our year-specific calibration of τij .
The ESCAP-World Bank Trade Costs Database We use this database for two purposes. In the
first, we use this to infer τ̄ , the ratio of agriculture trade costs to manufacturing trade costs. We
restrict the sample to the year 2005, and restrict the reporting countries and the partner ones to be
within our sample as listed in Table A.1. Using the variable names from the dataset, we compute
τ̄ as the simple average of tij(AB)/tij(D) across all observations, where tij corresponds to our
variable trade cost minus 1 and AB refers to the agricultural sector, D to the manufacturing sector.
We also use this dataset to compute the change in the trade barrier of China over time. The
trade costs measures are symmetric and therefore the trade barrier refers to both the inbound and
the outbound barrier. We compute the simple average across all trading partners across all sectors.
The average iceberg cost of selling into China was 3.605 in 1996, and it declined by 5.1% to
(3.605− 1) ∗ (1− 0.051) + 1 = 3.471 in 2006.
The USDA-ERS Database We use the data for three purposes: to calibrate the production func-
tion of each country, to compute the land endowment, and to compute the rural productivity. We
use the 2019 Oct 1st version of the data that covers 187 countries between 1961 and 2016. The
land endowment data are at the yearly frequency so we use the respective years for the 2005 and
2015 calibration. The factor-share data come at the decade frequency, so we use the factor share
in 2000–2010 for the calibration of 2005, and 2010–2020 for the 2015 calibration.
C.2 Data Sources, China
Input-Output Table of China We use the 2002 Input-Output Table of China to estimate the
agriculture share in consumption (α) and the labor share in differentiated products (β). The agri-
culture consumption share is computed as THC(1), and the total consumption is computed as∑42
i=1 THC(i). The labor share is the summation of all the value-added terms (TVA); we define
industries 02 to 21 as the differentiated industries.
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One-Percent Population Survey The One-Percent Population Survey was conducted in 2005
and 2015 by the National Statistics Bureau of China. Our sample in the year 2005 contains 2.6
million individuals, and in 2015, 1.4 million. We estimate the migration probability matrix using
this data.
We identify the original location of the individual as the follows. If the individual reported a
rural hukou in the 2005 survey (Question 11), or was entitled to contract rural land (Tu Di Cheng
Bao) in the 2015 survey (Question 11), then the individual is classified as originating from the
rural region by both definitions of a migrant (hukou-migrant or five-year-migrant). The original
prefecture for a hukou-migrant is the place of hukou registration.
The current prefecture of the individual is readily available in the survey. To distinguish be-
tween rural and urban areas, we rely on the “Urban-Rural Codes” (Cheng Xiang Hua Fen Ma)
reported in the survey. We classify the following codes as urban: 111 (city center, Shi Zhong Xin),
112 (city suburb, Cheng Xiang Jie He Bu), 121 (town center, Zhen Zhong Xin), 122 (township
suburbs, Zhen Xiang Jie He Bu), and the following codes as rural: 210 (large village, Xiang) and
220 (village, Cun).
We use the weighted population count in the surveys to account for the sampling weights, and
compute the out-migration probability from region j to region i as the sum of population weights
that move from j to i divided by the sum of the original population weights of region j.
Economic Census The Economic Census is used to compute the firm-to-population ratio in
China, which is in turn used to calibrate fe. We use the First Economic Census (2004) for the
calibration in 2005, and the Third Economic Census (2013) for 2015. We define firms as “legal
entity (Fa Ren)”.
Population Census The Population Censuses in 2000 and 2010 are used to construct the initial
population distributions in the 2005 and 2015 calibrations, respectively. As mentioned in Section
4.2.1, the relative population between the MUR and OUR is needed. According to our definitions
of cities and the two urban regions, the urban population (Shi Xia Qu Ren Kou) from the Population
Censuses is used to calculate the population ratio between the MUR and OUR.
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City Statistical Yearbooks We use the City Statistical Yearbooks to construct the GDP at the
city level, which was then used in many parts of the calibration exercise, such as the estimation
of productivity, amenity, and R̄i. To be consistent with our definition of cities, the urban GDP of
a prefecture is defined as the sum of the secondary and tertiary GDP in the urban districts of that
prefecture (Shi Xia Qu).
In addition, we also use the City Statistical Yearbooks to estimate the city-level amenity. The
following variables in the vector Xi come from the City Statistical Yearbooks: the number of
universities, middle schools, and primary schools; the number of university, middle school, and
primary school teachers; the number of public library books; the number of hospitals, hospital
beds, and doctors; and the percentage of green fields in constructed areas.
City-Level Climate and Geographical Variables The city-level temperature and precipitation
data come from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). We measure the
city-level climate using the 0.5-degree cell in which the city center resides. The elevation of a city
comes from the GTOPO30 database, and the slope is inferred from the elevation data. Lastly, the
ease of access to the national transportation network comes from Ma and Tang (2020b).
CBD Land Rents A 2004 ordinance requires that land sales by Chinese governments at all levels
must be publicized on the internet. However, only after 2007 did such data become complete and
relatively organized on government websites. We have land sales data from 2007 to 2017. As the
data in 2007 is still relatively sparse, we pool the data in both 2007 and 2008 to proxy for 2005.
Correspondingly, we use the data in 2017 to proxy for 2015. To proxy the CBD land rent, we
first use the average price of the top 10% land sales prices, and then annualize this according to
the number of years of the leasehold and a 10% interest rate. The 2017 data is quite clean, but
there are unreasonable outliers in the 2007–08 data. In some small cities, some annualized land
sale prices in 2007–08 are even much higher than the so-calculated CBD prices in Shenzhen and
Beijing in 2017. When all of the annualized land sale prices in the 2007–08 data are ranked, we
find that the first possibly sensible highest price is Guangzhou’s highest price at 13108, which is
still higher than Bejing’s average of the top 3% prices in 2017. Hence, we use 13108 as a cutoff to
trim all of the higher prices to alleviate concerns over measurement errors.
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Baidu Commuting Data Baidu Maps publishes annual reports on urban transportation. There is
a specific table on commuting distance and time for a hundred selected cities. For further details,
see https://jiaotong.baidu.com/reports/.
C.3 Estimation of µj at the city level
Ma and Tang (2020b) estimate city-level productivity in a heterogeneous-firm model setup similar
to the model in this paper. They back out the city-level productivity from the residual of the
following regression:
log (wj) = b0 + b1 log (Nj) + b2 log (MAj) + νj,
where Nj is the population of city j and wj is approximated by the per capita GDP of the city.
According to our definition of cities, the city population is the population in the collection of
districts in a prefecture (Shi Xia Qu Ren Kou), and the city GDP is the sum of secondary and
tertiary GDP in these districts; both variables are obtained from China City Statistical Yearbooks.
Here, term MAj summarizes the market access from location j that encompasses the internal
transportation network and market size distribution in China. Following Donaldson and Hornbeck






where θ is the trade elasticity. This term captures the ease of access to markets given a trade cost
matrix {τij}. The trade cost matrix is obtained from Ma and Tang (2020b). The city-level produc-
tivity is then computed as µj = exp (ν̃j/θ), where ν̃j is the residual of the above regression.25 The
city-level productivities are then used to infer the region-level productivities.
Lastly, note that the above regression excludes foreign economies. The exclusion is due to two
reasons. The first reason is data limitations: data on internal trade costs (τij) in China is scarce, and
the most detailed matrix from earlier work lacks information on trade costs with foreign economies.
25We cannot directly use the estimated city-level productivity from Ma and Tang (2020b) as their paper uses a
different trade elasticity.
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The second reason is inconsistency in the unit of observation. Whereas the data points within China
are at the city level, foreign economies in this regression would have been countries or even groups
of countries. For this reason, foreign economies in this regression would be much larger in size
than the cities in China, and they distort the point estimates and the residuals as commonly seen
in an OLS setting. For these two reasons, we include only the cities in China in the reduced-form
regression.
D Additional Results
D.1 Reverting Productivity and Amenity
In Section 4.3, we note that the evolution of productivity and amenity do not explain the observed
pattern based on the estimated parameters. In this appendix, we conduct two counter-factual anal-
yses to evaluate the impacts of these two channels on the migration flows. In these two exercises,
we revert the productivity and amenity estimates to the 2005 levels respectively while keeping all
the other parameters the same as in the baseline model in 2015. Table D.1 reports the migration
probabilities under these two counter-factual exercises.
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.666 0.093 0.210
MUR (d) 0.074 0.880 0.076
OUR (d) 0.260 0.027 0.715
(a) Reverting µi
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.606 0.090 0.165
MUR (d) 0.069 0.875 0.062
OUR (d) 0.325 0.036 0.773
(b) Reverting φi
Table D.1: Matrices of Migration Probability, Reverting Productivity and Amenity
Note: This table presents the matrices of migration probability. An element at the i-th row and the j-th column
indicates the probability of an individual originating from j and moving to i. Each column sums to 1. The data
source is the One-Percent Population Survey in the respective years, and an “origin” is defined as the place of hukou
registration.
Neither productivity nor amenity explain the observed pattern of migration probability. Under
the productivity in 2005, rural migrants are still 2.5 time more likely to move to the OUR, the same
as in the baseline. This is expected as the relative productivity between the MUR and OUR changes
little between the two years. Similarly, the evolution of amenities does not explain the migration
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pattern in 2015. Reverting the amenity leads to an even stronger preference for the OUR. This
result is, again, expected as the amenities of the OUR are stronger than those of the MUR in 2005.
D.2 The Role of the Fixed Exporting Barriers
In the Melitz framework, the decision of where to sell goods is captured by the fixed exporting
costs, fij . Such barriers shape firms’ decisions as to which markets to sell. However, we find that
market selection does not interact with the urbanization policy.
China Rural MUR OUR Rural ODC Urban ODC Rural ROW Urban ROW
Baseline 2015, low fij
Population 2.1847 0.6627 0.5210 1.0010 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2268 0.0611 0.2838 0.2359 0.2748 2.1756 6.8795 10.2768
Operating Firms 2.4575 - 1.2328 1.2247 - 189.5376 - 6187.4230
Exporting Firms 0.5727 - 0.2873 0.2854 - 15.0688 - 70.0431
λ21 = λ31 = λ
∗, low fij
Population 2.1847 0.6628 0.6208 0.9010 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2325 0.0622 0.2916 0.2393 0.2747 2.1750 6.9116 10.2713
Operating Firms 2.2649 - 1.2983 0.9666 - 183.8977 - 6005.4568
Exporting Firms 0.5878 - 0.3370 0.2509 - 14.6224 - 67.9738
Low λ, low fij
Population 2.1847 0.5766 0.6764 0.9317 1.4761 3.0510 0.0322 1.3668
Welfare 0.2619 0.0685 0.3095 0.2533 0.2749 2.1762 7.2123 10.2623
Operating Firms 1.6435 - 0.9636 0.6799 - 118.5085 - 3882.7503
Exporting Firms 0.4137 - 0.2426 0.1712 - 9.4340 - 43.8969
(a) Welfare
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.622 0.077 0.180
MUR (d) 0.221 0.896 0.080
OUR (d) 0.156 0.027 0.740
(b) Migration Probability, λ∗
Rural (o) MUR (o) OUR (o)
Rural (d) 0.484 0.082 0.190
MUR (d) 0.303 0.892 0.079
OUR (d) 0.213 0.027 0.731
(c) Migration Probability, low λ
Table D.2: Lowering the Fixed Costs of Exporting
Note: This table shows the welfare impacts of reducing the fixed costs of exporting.
To highlight the irrelevance of market selection, we simulate a counterfactual in which fij’s
are reduced to half the values in the baseline. With lower barriers to export, more firms engage in
international trade. Under both the baseline and the alternative urbanization policies, the fraction
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of exporting firms is higher than the baseline quantification. Similarly, the welfare also increases
with the lowered fij’s due to the gains from trade.
However, the migration patterns and the welfare impacts of the alternative urbanization policies
are remarkably similar to those under the baseline quantification. The lack of interaction between
exporting behavior and migration is due to the absence of intranational geography in the paper,
without which the MUR and OUR have equal access to the world market. As a result, variations
in the fixed exporting costs affect both regions equally, leaving little room to interact with the
urbanization policies.
Incorporating the intranational geography will only strengthen our main results. This is because
most of the megacities in the MUR region are in the coastal areas, which enjoy lower exporting
costs (both fixed and variable ones). Thus, the effects of a more uniform or laissez-faire urbaniza-
tion policy will be even larger.
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